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RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE-DEFENsE or Accor D
SATISFACTION HErD NOT WITHIN PIMARY JURISDICTION OF SEOBE-
TARY OF AGRIOULTRm IN ENFORCEMENT SUIT U'DER AGRicuLTuRAL
MARMING AGREMENT ACT
A farmers' cooperative had contracted with defendant dairy distributor
to supply defendant's milk requirements for ten years. The contract price
per unit was set at an amount to be calculated monthly on the basis of a
fixed premium above the minimum unit price determined for that month
under the applicable milk marketing order 1 promulgated pursuant to the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act.2 When the cooperative refused
to deliver at the agreed price, defendant under protest paid during several
months a higher-than-contract price, and at the termination of the business
relationship tendered a check for an amount equal to the contract price for
the last month minus the aggregate previously paid in excess of the con-
tract figure-a sum which was less than the minimum price for that month
under the administrative order. Defendant's check, which stated that it
represented payment in full, was accepted and cashed by the cooperative.
In an action to enforce the milk marketing order,8 the Government sought
a mandatory injunction to compel defendant to pay the cooperative the
difference between the amount of the check and the last month's minimum.
As against defendant's assertion that the Government was enforcing pay-
ment of a disputed private claim for the benefit of the cooperative and
therefore ought to be subject to the defense of accord and satisfaction, the
Government contended that its action was for enforcement of the order
under the act and that defendant's exclusive avenue of relief from the terms
of the order was the statutory review procedure through the Secretary of
Agriculture and then to the courts 4 Denying a Government motion for
summary judgment, the district court held that the act envisaged con-
current jurisdiction in the agency and the enforcing courts, and that since
there was in issue a legal defense which required no special technical com-
prehension of the milk industry and whose maintenance would have no
adverse effect on the milk program, the court would hear that defense.
Finding accord and satisfaction established under state law, the court
17 C.F. §§ 975.70-.71 (1955).
2Act of June 3, 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (codified in scattered sections of
7 U.S.C.).
3 Pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act § 8a(6), 48 Stat. 675
(1934), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 608a(6) (1958).
4 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act §8c(15), 49 Stat. 760 (1935), as
amended, 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15) (1958).
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dismissed the Government's complaint. United States v. Tapor-Ideal Dairy
Co., 175 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
To effectuate the act's declared policy of establishing orderly marketing
conditions for agricultural products and of maintaining commodity prices
at parity with other goods,5 section 608 authorizes the Secretary of Agri-
culture,6 upon the assent of a requisite number of producers and handlers,
7
to organize milk marketing areas within which the Secretary, through his
delegate, may set and maintain uniform prices to the producer.8 In each
area, a marketing order is issued which classifies milk by use 9 and requires
handlers to report monthly the quantity of milk purchased which falls into
each of the use classes and the price he has agreed to pay producers or
cooperatives for it.1° On the basis of this data "minimum prices" are
computed for the various classes "x (their difference representing recogni-
tion of the economic fact that milk values depend upon the uses to which it
is put); and from these, by a modal formula, a "uniform price" 12 is
calculated which is applicable to all the classes (to assure that the price a
producer receives will not vary with the use to which his purchaser puts the
milk). The "uniform price" is the minimum price per unit which each
handler in the area must pay his producers.'8  To enable all handlers-at
an equal advantage, whatever their use-to pay at least this uniform price,
the order requires the establishment of an agency-administered producer-
settlement fund. Into the fund every handler whose uses place his milk
in a high-return bracket must pay the amount per unit by which the "value"
of the milk used ("value" being computed on the basis of the minimum
class prices for his several uses, with certain adjustments, weighted to reflect
the relative amounts of the several classes used) 14 exceeds the uniform
5 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act § 2(1), 49 Stat. 751 (1935), as amended,
7 U.S.C. § 602(1) (1958).
6Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act §§ 8c(1)- (4), 49 Stat. 753 (1935), as
amended, 7 U.S.C. §§608c(1)-(4) (1958).
7Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act §§ 8c(5) (B) (i), (8)-(9), 49 Stat.
754, 757 (1935), 7 U.S.C. §§ 608c(5) (B) (i), (8)-(9) (1958). A negative vote of
the handlers, however, can be overriden by the Secretary. Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act § 8c(9), 49 Stat. 758 (1935), 7 U.S.C. § 608c(9) (1958).
8 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act § 8c(5), 49 Stat 754 (1935), as amended,
7 U.S.C. § 608c(5) (1958).
9 7 C.F.R. §§ 975.50-.57 (1955). For a general description of the operation of
milk marketing control orders see Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 290-301, 316-17
(1944); SHEPHERD, MARKETING FARm PRODUCTs-EcoNoMIc ANALYIsis 355-71 (3d
ed. 1955); Note, 65 HARv. L. REV. 328 (1951). The structure of regulation under
the various area orders is the same; throughout this comment citation will be to the
order for the Cleveland, Ohio milk marketing area, involved in the instant case.
10 7 C.F.R. § 975.40-.41 (1955).
117 C.F.R. § 975.60-.64 (1955). Other components are also involved in formu-
lating this value.
127 C.F.R. § 975.73 (1955).
13 7 C.F.R. § 975.80 (1955).
14 7 C.F.R. § 975.70 (1955).
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price paid the producer; and from the fund every low-return handler is
paid the amount by which the uniform exceeds his aggregate "value." 15
Handlers are required to pay cooperatives which are handlers (as was the
cooperative in the instant case) not less than the minimum (class) prices.:
6
Payment to producers and handlers is to be made monthly.'
7  The act
provides for a dissatisfied handler's petition to the Secretary of Agriculture
seeking modification of an order as not in accordance with law,'
8 and for
subsequent judicial review of the Secretary's determination.'"
Government enforcement of orders is by injunction out.of the federal
district courts.20  The statute itself neither prescribes nor expressly limits
what defenses may be available in enforcement proceedings, but in a series
of cases brought to compel payments to the producer-settlement fund the
courts have with virtual unanimity refused to entertain defenses of any
nature on the merits 21 (other than, presumably, the defense of nonviolation
167 C.F.R. § 975.83-.85 (1955); see Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
§§8c(5) (B)-(C), 49 Stat 754 (1935), 7 U.S.C. §§608c(5) (B)-(C) (1958).
16 7 C.F.R. § 975.80(c) (1955) : "On or before the 15th day after the end of each
delivery period, each handler shall pay a cooperative association which is a handler
. . . not less than an amount computed by multiplying the minimum prices for milk
in each class . . . [by hundred weight of milk]." "Delivery period" is defined by
7 C.F.R. § 975.16 (1955) as "the calendar month or the total portion thereof during
which this part is in effect"
177 C.F.R. §§ 975.80(a)-(c) (1955).
I8 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act §8c(15) (A), 49 Stat 760 (1935),
7 U.S.C. § 608c(15) (A) (1958) : "Any handler subject to an order may file a written
petition with the Secretary of Agriculture, stating that any such order or any pro-
vision of any such order or any obligation imposed in connection therewith is not in
accordance with law and praying for a modification thereof or to be exempted there-
from"
19 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act § 8c(15) (B), 49 Stat 760 (1937), as
amended, 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15) (B) (1958).
20 "The several district courts of the United States are vested with jurisdiction
specifically to enforce, and to prevent and restrain any person from violating any
order, regulation . . . ." Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act § 8a(6), 48 Stat
675 (1934), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §608a(6) (1958).
21 In enforcement actions to require payment into the fund, courts have declined
to hear as defenses allegations that requisite findings after hearing were not made,
United States v. Turner Dairy Co., 166 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813
(1948) ; that notice and hearing in administrative proceedings were inadequate, United
States v. Ideal Farms, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 28 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 262 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.
1958) ; that the order was invalid, United States v. Lehigh Valley Co-op. Farmers,
161 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ; that the Administrator incorrectiy charged defend-
ant with receiving milk from a producer which the defendant himself produced, United
States v. Hinman Farms Prods., Inc., 156 F. Supp. 607 (N.D.N.Y. 1957); that the
Administrator had no authority under the order to adjudge defendant a handler as
to certain milk and to bill him for that milk, United States v. Wood, 61 F. Supp.
175 (D. Mass. 1945) ; that the Administrator incorrectly classified the milk, United
States v. Hogansburg Milk Co., 57 F. Supp. 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1944); United States
v. Ridgeland Creamery Co., 47 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Wis. 1942) ; see Panno v. United
States, 203 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1953) (fruit) ; La Verne Co-op. Citrus Ass'n v. United
States, 143 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1944) (fruit); American Fruit Growers, Inc. v.
United States, 105 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1939). But see Chapman v. United States,
139 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1943), entertaining on the merits the defense that the fund
was discriminatorily administered in favor of defendant's competitors. The opinion
does not discuss the jurisdictional issue.
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of the order).22 In United States v. Ruzicka,2 3 the only enforcement case
to reach the Supreme Court, the Court, stressing the need for prompt pay-
ment into the settlement fund if danger to the continuing stability of the
milk marketing program were to be avoided,2 4 sustained a district court's
mandatory injunction issued to compel payment without hearing defendant's
contentions that the Secretary's claim against him was based on faulty
inspections and the employment of inaccurate testing procedures. Inasmuch
as those contentions could have been presented to the Secretary by petition
and thereafter tested in the courts under the review provisions of the act,25
the Court found in the statutory scheme an implied congressional purpose
to forbid consideration of them in the government's injunction suit. This
rationale has been echoed by many lower courts; 2 6 others refusing to listen
to the merits of offered defenses add the reason that the defendant has
already begun administrative proceedings and as yet failed to exhaust
them.27 In all of these cases, however, the issue sought to be raised was
so integrally related to the administration of the milk control program
that the decisions may as well be supported by a primary-jurisdiction as
by an exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies analysis.28  Indeed, the instant
court reads Ruicka, as a primary jurisdiction case. It finds nothing in that
decision inconsistent with the proposition of concurrent judicial and ad-
ministrative competence over defenses to the Secretary's claims,29 and in
determining when to decline to exercise that competence it looks to the
nature of the particular question involved-whether the issues require an
expert's understanding of the industry.
This interpretation of Ruzicka and its progeny is doubtful, not only
because of the strong exclusive-channel-of-relief language of Mr. Justice
2 2 Cf. United States v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Cal.
1940), modified, 124 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1941). See also United States v. Adler's
Creamery, Inc., 107 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1939), refusing an injunction pendente lite in
the absence of government showing of irreparable injury. But after hearing a manda-
tory injunction was issued and affirmed, 110 F.2d 482 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
657 (1940).
23329 U.S. 287 (1946).
24 The working of the fund is explained in text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
Since payments must be made monthly out of the fund to handlers in order for them
to pay their producers the uniform minimum price, it is essential that the fund be kept
solvent. Thus the need for promptness.25 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act § 8c(15) (B), 49 Stat 760 (1935), as
amended, 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15) (B) (1958).
26 United States v. Ideal Farms, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 28 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 262 F.2d
334 (3d Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Hinman Farms Prods., Inc., 156 F. Supp. 607
(N.D.N.Y. 1957) (dictum) ; United States v. Ridgeland Creamery Co., 47 F. Supp.
145 (W.D. Wis. 1942); see Panno v. United States, 203 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1953)
(alternative holding); United States v. Wood, 61 F. Supp. 175 (D. Mass. 1945);
cf. La Verne Co-op. Citrus Ass'n v. United States, 143 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1944)
(dictum).
27 United States v. Wood, supra note 26 (dictum) ; United States v. Hogansburg
Milk Co., 57 F. Supp. 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1944) (alternative holding); cf. La Verne
Co-op. Citrus Assgn v. United States, supra note 26.
28 See note 21 supra and text accompanying notes 23 and 24 supra.
29 The court read § 15(c) of the act, "Any handler subject to an order may file
a written petition . . ." as intended to grant concurrent jurisdiction. (Emphasis
added.)
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Frankfurter's opinion,3 0 but especially in light of the well-established prac-
tice in these cases-more consistent with exclusive administrative com-
petence than with a primary jurisdiction theory-to refuse to stay
enforcement proceedings pending determination of the contested issue via
the Secretary of Agriculture channel.3 1 The instant court relies heavily,
in asserting its discretion to select among questions those appropriate to
relegate to administrative decision, upon language in Ruzicka that the
decision there must "hug the shore of the precise problem." 3 2 Yet this
passage, read in context, makes clear that the distinction which Mr. Justice
Frankfurter is inviting by it is not between questions of differing technical
difficulty under the act, but between the act's scheme of judicial review as a
whole and the judicial review provisions of other federal regulatory pro-
grams; it is a reiteration, in fact, of its author's caution in Stark v. Wickard
that "Apart from the text and texture of a particular law . . . 'judicial
review' is a mischievous abstraction." 3 3 Nevertheless, even within the
exclusive-jurisdiction syntax the holding of Rusicka and the other settle-
ment-fund cases is limited on their facts to the situation where the defense
raised is in some part cognizable before the Secretary. The instant court's
decision, then, would be supportable if it were true that in the case at bar
there existed no dispositive issue which the Secretary could meaningfully
decide. The court's reasoning-presented in the somewhat different focus
of its primary jurisdiction perspective-suggests that it regarded this as
the fact: it speaks of accord and satisfaction as a defense which is on the
same footing as the defense that defendant had paid the money into the
fund 3 4 --a defense, in effect, of nonviolation of the order.
30 329 U.S. at 291-92.
31United States v. Turner Dairy Co., 166 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 813 (1948); United States v. Ideal Farms, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 28 (D.N.J.), aff'd,
262 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Hinman Farms Prods., Inc., 156
F. Supp. 607 (N.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Wood, 61 F. Supp. 175 (D. Mass.
1945); United States v. Hogansburg Milk Co., 57 F. Supp. 297 (N.D.W.Y. 1944).
Section 608c(15) (B) of the act expressly provides that the pendency of proceedings
before the Secretary or before a court on appeal from the Secretary's ruling shall
not "impede, hinder, or delay" the obtaining of injunctive relief under § 608a(6).
The courts have not distinguished between these pending cases and cases in which
administrative proceedings are not yet instituted, issuing immediate enforcement
process without stay or opportunity of defense in both instances. See Panno v. United
States, 203 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Ridgeland Creamery Co., 47
F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Wis. 1942). But see United States v. Lehigh Valley Co-op.
Farmers, 161 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Pa. 1957), ordering payment into the registry of
the court instead of into the fund. In light of the insistence in Ruzicka upon the
necessity of making the money immediately available for the uses of the fund, the
use of this device in settlement-fund cases is of dubious wisdom. United States v.
Ideal Farms, Inc., supra, gives some indication that Lehigh Valley has little growing
power.
32 329 U.S. at 295. The instant court at 681 said "were it not for this . . .
pronouncement, indicating that the Supreme Court was leaving open the general
question of the availability of the judiciary as an initial forum anf deciding only
the precise question before it, the Government's position in the instant case would be
much stronger."
33 321 U.S. 288, 312 (1944) (dissent).
84 Instant case at 683.
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The most appealing aspect of this approach is its practical outcome on
the facts of the instant case. Unlike the fund cases, where the payment
compelled by injunction went into the hands of the administration from
which it could be gotten back with relative ease pursuant- to an administra-
tive proceeding,3" here it was sought to have defendant pay over to the
cooperative for distribution, presumably, to its member producers. By
the time of termination of whatever proceedings by petition to the Secretary
might be appropriate, followed by civil judicial action against the cooperative
(for, whatever competence the Secretary may have in the premises, he
certainly has no jurisdiction to adjudicate rights under contract between
private parties), the difficulties of defendant's recovering his money would
be enormous. 36 Manifestly this consideration moved the court.37 Yet this
harm to defendant is not the inevitable cost of having the Secretary rule on
his case,38 and even if it were, the contemplation of it would not be deter-
minative except in the absence of any countervailing factor which, under the
legislative program for the milk industry as a whole, deserved priority over
the convenience of a single individual.
There is here such a countervailing factor. The court's very attempt
to equate accord and satisfaction with actual payment pursuant to the terms
of the administrative order points out that that equation is not a matter of
logic or analogy or inference from fact, but a conclusion of federal law 39
which must be predicated upon decisions of policy affecting matters integral
to the administrative regulatory scheme. If the cooperative had not cashed
the defendant's check the presence of a determinative issue of federal law
would be apparent: whether payments in excess of the contract (and
minimum) price during several prior months could, under the Secretary's
35 But see the peculiar facts in United States v. Lehigh Valley Co-op. Farmers,
161 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (money allegedly had been distributed from fund
to parties not entitled to it; this fact may in part explain the peculiar disposition of
the case).
3 6 In the instant case, indeed, the cooperative had disbanded prior to the time of
trial, multiplying the number of potential obstacles to recovery.
37 See instant case at 683.
3 8 Equity's power to tailor its decrees would seem adequate to the situation.
Among other possible devices, the court could order defendant to pay the amount
claimed due into the registry of the court where it might be held pending his timely
petition for administrative redress. It has been suggested, note 31 stpra, that the
employment of this technique was unwise on the facts of United States v. Lehigh
Valley Co-op. Farmers, 161 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Pa. 1957), where there was relatively
little danger to the defendant and where the result of the decree was to withhold
the payment from the producer-settlement fund, whose immediate need for cash had
been one of the rationales of Ruzicka. In the instant case, conversely, payment into
the registry would serve a necessary protective function with minimal impediment
to the operation of the regulatory program.
39 The out-of-hand relegation of the "accord and satisfaction' issue to state law,
see instant case at 684, is wholly unsound. Whether that issue is appropriate for
the application of a strict federal common law, drawing its tenor from the policies
of the act, within the rule of D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
315 U.S. 447 (1942), or Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943),
is perhaps questionable. But at the least the area is one, within the ambit of the
federal regulatory pattern, where federal law surrounds and circumscribes the per-
missible reach of state rules of decision.
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regulations, be credited against the required minimum payment for the
month in question. Acceptance of the check does not obviate that question,
but merely adds a dimension to it: whether with the addition of that fact
(which by operation of state law works an accord and satisfaction) all of
the circumstances amount to a compliance with the federal order. That
order requires monthly payments.4 0  No doubt reasons both of administra-
tive convenience and of market stability underlie the requirement. Credited
prepayments may disturb the balance of the program. Releases-in-law
may offer opportunities for manipulation of prices which by statute and
regulation are fixed.4 ' Potentialities may inhere in these practices which,
though imperceptible to the court's inexpert eye, will be discovered danger-
ous by practiced administrative officials. Inasmuch as Congress has estab-
lished a policy of government-administered price controls as a means to
security of the agricultural market, and the Secretary under his delegated
authority has prescribed a scheme of required payments on a fixed schedule
and at a fixed minimum rate, the decision as to what these prescriptions
demand on the facts of this particular defendant's case is a matter so
"entwined with industry problems" 42 as to require submission to the
Secretary. His determination will be reviewable by the federal judiciary as
provided by the act, and that determination may ultimately leave room
for the application of state law. But the question is one of that'class whose
resolution Congress has entrusted, at least in the first instance, to his
judgment.
ADMIRALTY-,CONSTITUTION DOES NOT INHIBIT INVOKING
STATE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY LAw HIn STANDARDS OF DUTY TO
RECOVER FOR MARITIME DEATH: oN INLAND WATERS
An independent contractor engaged by the federal government to
make repairs on its Bonneville Dam in the Columbia River within the
territorial limits of Oregon sent a working party by boat to the foot of the
40 See note 16 supra.
41 Compare the rulings disapproving the setting off of one month's excess pay-
ment against another month's minimum in the following arguably distinguishable
cases: Pennsylvania Milk Control Comm'n v. Royale Dairy Co., 73 Pa. D. & C. 431
(C.P. Mifflin County 1948); In re Franklin Co-op. Creamery Ass'n, 10 Agric. Dec.
1165 (Secretary of Agriculture 1951) ; It re Henshaw, 1 Agric. Dec. 721 (Secretary
of Agriculture 1942).
42 Instant case at 683. In Queensboro Farms Prods., Inc. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d
969, 974-75 (2d Cir. 1943), judge Frank observed: "[T]he 'milk problem' is exquisitely
complicated. The city-dweller or poet who regards the cow as a symbol of bucolic
serenity is indeed naive. From the udders of that placid animal flows a bland liquid
indispensable to human health but often provoking as much human strife and nasti-
ness as strong alcoholic beverages. The milking of animals in order to make use of
their lactic secretions for human food was one of the greatest human inventions, but
the domestication of milk has not been accompanied by a successful domestication of
some of the meaner human impulses in all those engaged in the milk industry .
The pressure of milk is indeed powerful."
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spillway to take soundings. Approaching the dam, the boat struck a pier
and capsized in turbulent waters beneath the spillway, where decedent, a
carpenter-employee of the contractor and member of the sounding party,
drowned. Decedent's administrator brought an action in a federal district
court against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act,1 which
subjects the sovereign to "the law of the place where the [negligent or
wrongful] act or omission occurred."12  Because federal maritime law
(here applicable because the "place" of the accident was navigable waters 3),
lacking its own remedy for wrongful death in state territorial waters,4 has
been held to look to the appropriate state wrongful death statute,5 plaintiff
administrator brought claims under the general wrongful death act of
Oregon 6 and the Employers' Liability Law of that state.7 The district
court found: (1) that plaintiff had failed to prove negligence under the
wrongful death statute, and (2) that the "high standard of care" of the
Employers' Liability Law, which would render defendant liable for failure
1 "[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
2 See note 1 .upra. "The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not
be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674
(1958).
3 Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922); Chelentis v. Lucken-
bach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
4 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). The Death on the High Seas Act, 41
Stat 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1958), provides an action for death occurring
on the high seas.
5 E.g., United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613
(1959) ; The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959) ; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
257 U.S. 233 (1921). Prior to the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920),
46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1958), recovery was also permitted under state wrongful death
acts for deaths occurring on the high seas. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
6 ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.020 (Supp. 1959).
7 "Protection and safety of persons in hazardous employment generally. Generally,
all owners, contractors or subcontractors and other persons having charge of, or
responsible for, any work involving a risk or danger to the employes or the public,
shall use every device, care and precaution which it is practicable to use for the
protection and safety of life and limb, limited only by the necessity for preserving the
efficiency of the structure, machine or other apparatus or device, and without regard
to the additional cost of suitable material or safety appliance and devices." ORE. Rev.
STAT. § 654.305 (Supp. 1959). The plaintiff's action was not based on the theory that
the United States was decedent's employer, but on state court construction of the
employers' liability statute which permits the bringing of an action by "those whose
employment or duties require them to be about machinery of an employer other than
his own or whose duties may require such person to expose himself in or about hazard-
ous conditions or structures of such other employer which are prohibited or circum-
scribed by the Act." Byers v. Hardy, 337 P.2d 806, 809 (Ore. 1959). Brief for Peti-
tioner, pp. 32-33, Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960). Numerous other Oregon
cases were relied on by both plaintiff and defendant in contesting the applicability
of the statute to the facts of this case. See Hess v. United States, supra at 321 n.9.
The Supreme Court left this aspect of the case to resolution by the circuit court on
remand. Id. at 321.
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to "use every device, care and precaution which it is practicable to use for
the protection and safety of life and limb . . .," 8 could not constitutionally
be applied to a maritime case.9 The court of appeals affirmed on both
counts.10 The Supreme Court, reversing, held that the substantive stand-
ards of care under state law, rather than those of admiralty, measure re-
sponsibility for the conduct which produces a maritime death. The Court
left open the question whether some state wrongful death act "might
contain provisions so offensive to traditional principles of maritime law
that the admiralty would decline to enforce them," but concluded that the
Oregon Employers' Liability Law "presents no such problem," and may
be invoked "without constitutional inhibition." I, Hess v. United States,
361 U.S. 314 (1960).
Consequent to a constitutional grant 12 and implementing congressional
legislation, 3 the federal courts-without reference to the amount in contro-
versy, diversity of citizenship, or the presence of any independent federal
question-have a jurisdiction over maritime affairs which "comprehends
all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries." 14 The substance of United
States maritime law is composed of traditional rules and concepts found in
the general maritime law of nations, improvisations to meet the peculiar
needs of this country, and congressional enactments. 15  State courts have
been permitted by Congress to exercise jurisdiction in maritime cases
where there is a recognized common-law remedy for a maritime wrong 16
8 OR. REv. STAT. § 654.305 (Supp. 1959).
9 The district court held alternatively that the Oregon Employers' Liability La-w
would not, by its own terms, render the United States liable. Hess v. United States,
1958 Am. Mar. Cas. 660 (D. Ore. 1957).
10 The circuit court expressly refrained from deciding whether the Employers'
Liability Law, if constitutionally susceptible of application, would impose liability
upon the United States on the facts. Hess v. United States, 259 F.2d 285, 292 n.9
(9th Cir. 1958).
"1 Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 320-21 (1960). The plaintiff did not
challenge before the Supreme Court the finding that the United States was not guilty
of such negligence as would make it liable under the wrongful death statute of Oregon,
but only contested the lower court's denial of application of the Employers' Liability
Law. Id. at 317.
12 "The judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend . . . to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
13 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of
the states of: (1) Any case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors
in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. §1333
(1958).
14 De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C. Mass. 1815) (Mr. Justice Story).
15 See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382-83
(1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953); Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 55 (1932) ; Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924) ; The Lottawanna,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874) ; GmUoR.M & BLACK, ADmaUr.y §§ 1-16 (1957) ; Note,
67 H~Av. L. REv. 1214 (1954).
16 In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress, bestowing exclusive admiralty juris-
diction on the district courts, provided for "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right
of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it. ...
REv. STAT. § 563 (1875) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958)). In Steamboat Co. v. Chase,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1872), an action for a maritime tort based on a state wrong-
ful death statute was held within the saving clause.
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and, in addition, the Court has recognized a law-making competence in the
states to "supplement" maritime law,' 7 although they may not contradict
it or interfere with its uniform operation.18 Thus, since admiralty provides
no remedy for death on state territorial waters, 19 state wrongful death
statutes may be invoked to ground recovery.2 0 This rule obtains even
though the Supreme Court jealously preserves to the national government
exclusive law-creating powers in regard to nonfatal maritime injuries.
21
Of course, the states may not impose even their wrongful death statutes
where Congress has pre-empted the field: 2 2 state wrongful death recovery
cannot be had when death occurs on the high seas,23 or where relief is
sought against a harbor worker's employer, 24 or for the death of a seaman. 25
The application of state statutes in the remaining class of maritime death
17Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921) (wrongful death stat-
ute) ; The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 406 (1907) (wrongful death statute). See Just v.
Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, modified and rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 668 (1941) (state
statute providing for survival of an action against a deceased tortfeasor) ; Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924) (state statute making agreements to
arbitrate specifically enforceable where admiralty only provided damages for breach
held a permissible application of state law in a maritime case).
18 The states have not been permitted to interfere with maritime "uniformity"
in injury cases. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625
(1959); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrick Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) ; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl,
266 U.S. 449 (1925) ; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918) ; South-
ern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (state workmen's compensation act held
not applicable to a maritime tort) ; see Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S.
255 (1922). "If there is any sense at all in making maritime law a federal subject,
then there must be some limit set to the power of the states to interfere in the field
of its working." GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 15, at § 1-17. See Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (state burden of proof of fraud in
obtaining a release cannot be applied in the case of an injured seaman). But see
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) (marine insurance
and state laws of breach of warranty) ; GILMORE & BLACK, op cit. supra note 15, at
§9 1-17, 2-8.
19 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
20 E.g., United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S.
613 (1959); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 US. 588 (1959); Western Fuel Co. v.
Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921) ; The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
21 See cases cited note 18 mspra.
22 Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930) (Jones Act supersedes state
act claims provisions). For an excellent exposition of the roles of Congress and the
Court in the admiralty field, see Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S.
21, 43 (1934) (holding constitutional the Ship Mortgage Act, 41 Stat. 1000 (1920),
46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1958)).
23 Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1958).
24 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927),
33 U.S.C. § 903 (1958).
25 Recovery for Injury to or Death of Seaman (Jones Act), 41 Stat. 1007 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958). A seaman, qua seaman, is such only in relation to the ship
as to whose crew he is a member-i.e., he is not a seaman with respect to a wrong-
doer other than his employer. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), in
which the representative of a nonseaman shipboard worker invoked a state wrongful
death statute to recover for death caused by unseaworthiness, may point up an
anomaly in this area. Harbor-worker death can be remedied on the unseaworthiness
theory, but that doctrine will not be available in the case of death of a seaman-the
class to whom the duty of maintaining a seaworthy vessel has historically been owed.
Harbor workers can go against the ship's owner as a third-party tortfeasor and, he
not being their employer, the action is not barred by the Longshoremen's and Harbor
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cases 26 despite pervasive federal law covering maritime injuries 27 has
been variously rationalized as permitting the states to represent a peculiarly
"local" interest,28 to fill a "void," 29 or to provide a better rule than the
no-recovery admiralty rule.30  The adequacy of such theories to reconcile
wholly an apparent federal-state conflict has been subject to particular
challenge in cases decided last term and this.
31
In The Tungus v. Skovgaard,32 the Court held that recovery under a
state wrongful death statute, insofar as predicated on the theory that
defendant owed decedent the absolute duty 33 of maintaining a seaworthy
ship, can be had only if the state law chooses, of itself, to encompass a claim
for unseaworthiness. Further, the Court said, such a claim as is embraced
by the state is subject to state-imposed restrictions regarding contributory
negligence and assumption of risk, although such limitations differ from
those which the maritime law would apply to liability for the same conduct
had death not ensued.3 4 The reasoning of the majority was that the state,
having created the right of action for death, necessarily has the power to
determine the conditions subject to which that right exists: "It is incumbent
upon a court enforcing [the state's policy expressed in a wrongful death
enactment] . . to enforce it all; it may not pick or choose." 35 Four
Justices, in vigorous dissent, maintained that the standards of maritime
injury law apply, utilizing the state general remedy for tortious death as
a mere vehicle by which to render operative federal law.3 6 Under their
Workers' Compensation Act. Seamen, however, have no third-party claim against
the owner of the ship since they are employed by him. The Jones Act death recovery
(a negligence standard) against the seaman's employer is exclusive, and a state's
wrongful death statute cannot be invoked. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38
(1930). But see Holland v. Steag, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1956) ; Kernan
v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958) (dictum).
2 6 These cases, in light of the statutes cited notes 23-25 supra, and state workmen's
compensation laws, are for the most part actions against a third-party tortfeasor,
when the decedent is a worker, or actions by nonemployees such as passengers.
2 7 See cases cited note 18 supra.
28 The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1893), modified sub nom. The
Transfer No. 4 & the Car Float No. 16, 61 Fed. 364, 367-68 (2d Cir. 1894), dismissed
on motion, 163 U.S. 693 (1895). See instant case at 331-33 (Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissenting).
29 See, e.g., 41 VA. L. REv. 251, 252 (1955); 34 B.U.L. Rnv. 365, 366 (1954).
Cf. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592 (1959).
30 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HAv. L. Rxv. 84, 148-49 (1959).
3 1 Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960) ; Hess v. United States,
361 U.S. 314 (1960); United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Haecki, 358
U.S. 613 (1959) ; The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). Cf. Kermarec v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
32358 U.S. 588 (1959). Accord, Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., supra note 31.
33 Seaworthiness is an absolute and nondelegable duty, a liability irrespective of
fault, that the owner of a vessel owes to the members of the crew. Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). Thus
a state wrongful death statute which provided recovery in case of negligence might
not be read as broad enough to include a claim for unseaworthiness.
34 358 U.S. at 595.
35 Id. at 593.
36 Id. at 603, 608-09 (in dissent, the Chief Justice, and Justices Brennan, Black
and Douglas).
1960]
904 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.108
view, any application of the substantive state law itself would be un-
constitutionally offensive to "the uniform character of the general maritime
law." 3 7 This term, in the instant case, even the Justices who had com-
posed the majority in Tungus disagreed as to the constitutional propriety
of enforcing state death statutes in maritime cases when the state law
imposes a standard of duty more stringent than that required by admiralty.38
The opinions in Hess, in view of Tungus, manifest four theories among
the members of the Court as to the role of state wrongful death statutes
in maritime cases. Mr. Justice Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion
in Tungus, asserts almost unqualifiedly in Hess that, within their terri-
torial limits, state statutes may dictate the conditions and incidents of
liability for maritime death. His leaving the back door open for admiralty
to decline to enforce some state statute "so offensive" to federal maritime
law, coupled with the failure in his opinion to subject the Oregon statute's
standard-of-care provisions to close comparative scrutiny, suggests that he
might require an affirmative showing of actual prejudice to maritime in-
terests to render a state wrongful death statute constitutionally objection-
able. The four dissenters in Tungus, not endorsing this view, nevertheless
voted to achieve a result in the instant case contrary to their belief that the
substance of state law should in no case apply to maritime death liability.
As long as the doctrine of Tungus prevails, they contended, it should be
applied "evenhandedly"-to cases in which state law provides an easier
recovery as well as to those where the state restricts the recovery admiralty
would have given had the decedent lived.3 9 Thus, their original position
remains substantially intact, the result in the instant case demonstrating the
inadequacies they perceived in the rationale of Tungus. Between these
poles of wholly incorporating or wholly rejecting state substantive law
lie the two dissents in the instant case. Justices Harlan and Frankfurter
maintain that, while a state may restrict the right of recovery for death
where admiralty's standards would have permitted injury recovery for the
same conduct, state law cannot constitutionally impose a higher standard
of care on the defendant than that required by admiralty.40 This conclusion
is premised on federal "supremacy" in maritime matters: the standards of
care imposed involve a significant federal interest. But wrongful death
actions represent only a peculiarly "local" concern. The state, therefore,
may deal with this local problem in any way it wishes (Tungus), providing
it does not attempt to regulate the defendant's conduct by raising standards
of care which encroach upon admiralty's dictates in the area of federal
37 See 358 U.S. at 604 (dissent); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S.
372, 384 (1918).
38 The Tungus majority was composed of Justices Stewart, Clark, Harlan, Frank-
furter and Whittaker. In the instant case, Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Whit-
taker dissented, the dissenters from Tungus, with Justices Stewart and Clark com-
posing the majority.
39 Instant case at 321. While voting for a result, these Justices are actually in
dissent on the theory of both cases.
40 Id. at 322 n.1 and accompanying text.
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interest (Hess).41 Concurring in this dissent, Mr. Justice Whittaker
added, however, that state "substantive" law, whether stricter or laxer,
could not apply.42 As he voted with the majority in Tungus, the implica-
tion clearly is that a state may or may not provide death recovery for a
standard of duty imposed by admiralty, but that once the state has pro-
vided such a recovery, substantive maritime law must govern.
43
The premise in the dissents that federal supremacy is not violated by
a state's restricting plaintiffs' recoveries must rest on the "local" nature
of a wrongful death action.44 This theory, however, does not explain why
the states may not also restrict recovery in maritime injury cases. Yet, the
Court in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique 45 last term
unanimously reasserted the exclusiveness of federal maritime law in injury
actions. Insofar as a state's strong interest (contrasted with a minimal
federal interest) in death actions is based on a policy to provide for
families without breadWinners, 46 there is little logic in saying that such a
state interest is minimal (and the federal interest supreme), when the
wage-earner is only incapacitated by a maritime injury, not killed. Like-
wise, it cannot be fairly contended that federal law has a dominant interest
in setting standards of care only: standards are established not in vacuo,
but for the benefit of those engaged in maritime enterprises, and preventing
injury is not a more compelling incentive for erecting a standard of care
than is avoiding death. Neither can the "uniformity" rationale be invoked
to support a federal supremacy in maximum-standard setting which leaves
those for whose protection standards are established looking to diverse
state-created rights not comporting with the maritime standards. Indeed,
only the polar positions represented by the Justices composing the Hess
majority offer consistent answers to the federal-state conflict posed by these
recent cases. Of course, the result of the position taken by Justices Stewart
and Clark in Tungus and in Hess is to leave federal supremacy in the
maritime injury field as an historical vestige, operative, but manifesting
no vital principle of constitutional law: if federal maritime law does not
demand uniformity in death cases, to demand it in injury cases merely
represents that admiralty law is entangled in a constitutional grant and
judicial precedents for which it finds little logical consistency or practical
41 Id. at 332-34.
42 Id. at 339.
43 Mr. Justice Whittaker, dissenting in Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S.
340, 347 (1960).
44 "Where tortious conduct causes death, the decision of a State to provide a
right of action in favor of the victim's estate or beneficiaries represents a response
to considerations peculiarly within traditional state competence: providing for the
victim's family, and preventing pauperism by shifting what would otherwise be a
public responsibility to those who committed the wrong. These are matters inti-
mately concerned with the State's interest in regulating familial relationships." Mr.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in the instant case at 332. See The City of Norwalk, 55
Fed. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1893), modified sub nom. The Transfer No. 4 & the Car Float
No. 16, 61 Fed. 364, 367-68 (2d Cir. 1894), dismissed on motion, 163 U.S. 693 (1895).
45 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
4
6 See note 44 supra.
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sense. On the other hand, the dissenters in Tungus would use any state
statute for tortious death as a peg on which to hang the federal admiralty
hat. In effect, this would make the uniformity of maritime injury law
applicable to death on state navigable waters, fashioning a body of mari-
time law for wrongful death recovery.47 This approach no doubt stems
from a strong desire to create a general admiralty death cause by judicial
fiat-a desire frustrated and turned to rationalization under the com-
pulsion of prevailing concepts of Court-legislature power-allocation in
light of the Death on the High Seas Act,48 which, in creating such a death
cause, expressly excepted deaths in state territorial waters.49
Indeed, that act probably lies at the core of most of the disagreement
and inconsistency in the area. Clearly its exemption of territorial waters
was conceived with the purpose of making room for the states,50 but how
much room and for what purpose is indeterminate. 51 All of the Justices
seem to regard that exemption as a pronouncement of legislative policy
marking the bornes of federal law-making competence and opposing a
categorical obstacle to the Court's own creation of a death right 5 2 which,
47 358 U.S. at 603.
4841 Stat 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1958). Concerning questions of the
possibly unique nature of this power-allocation in admiralty, see note 52 infra.
49The federal right created by 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958),
arises in the event of a wrongful act "occurring on the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories
or dependencies of the United States." And 41 Stat. 538 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 767
(1958), further provides that "the provisions of any State statute giving or regu-
lating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter.
Nor shall this chapter apply to the Great Lakes or to any waters within the terri-
torial limits of any State, or to any navigable waters in the Panama Canal Zone."
50 See S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); H.R. REP. No. 674, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1920); 59 CONG. REc. 4482-86 (1920) (remarks of Representative
Volstead).
51 See the inconclusive discussions of the legislative history of the act in Tungus,
358 U.S. at 593 (majority) and 607-08 (dissent) ; and in Hess, instant case at 330.
52 There is a certain irony in judicial deference to Congress in the admiralty
sphere. In contrast to the vast run of subjects of fede-al question litigation, where
federal jurisdiction and hence the law-making competence of the federal judiciary
depend upon the exercise by Congress of its Article I powers (28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1958), National Mut Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949);
see Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157
(1953) ; Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion
in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797
(1957)), Congress' own legislative powers in admiralty are not among the enumerated
ones of Article I, but have been spun out of the grant of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction to the federal courts in Article III. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 55 (1932). This distinction has supported a very different Court-legislature
relationship in some admiralty matters than that which prevails in other spheres.
See State v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), holding unconstitutional congressional attempts to carve
out of admiralty and give over to state law the class of workman's compensation
case which Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), had regarded as
beyond the power of state law to arrogate to itself. That a contemporary court
would follow this line of decision and claim a coequal or superior authority as against
Congress is, however, extraordinarily unlikely. See Davis v. Department of Labor
& Indus., 317 U.S. 249, 252-56 (1942). Note, in any event, that a judicial decision to
create an admiralty death cause in the face of an apparently pre-empting congres-
sional enactment poses problems different from those of Dawson and Stewart. The
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apparently, a substantial portion of the Court would want to create. The
positions of the various Justices represent the points to which, within each
one's conception of the intendment of the act and the extent to which it
tethers the Court, each finds it necessary to go in order to borrow back
from the states some measure of the admiralty power. Diversely under-
stood, the act may require the adoption of "all" or "a portion" or "virtually
none" of a wrongful death statute in order to give adequate recognition to
the perceived congressional command that state, not federal, law operate in
the premises. The result is the situation which Hess embodies-a decision
by a six-Justice majority, four of whom expressly disavow its principles and
declare their readiness to overrule it. The significantly larger part of the
Justices have used Hess as a vehicle for rejecting the wholesale adoption of
state rules for decision to which the Hess holding theoretically commits
the Court.
53
A more stable resolution is both inevitable and imminent,54 and-in
light not only of the Hess opinions but also of the Court's increasingly
vigorous assertion of federal exclusivity in the nondeath injury cases 55 it
is foreseeable that that resolution will take the form of a gravitation toward
wider federal, and narrower state, authority in maritime death liability. If
there is any present-day vitality to "uniformity" in admiralty, the pressure
of that concept must necessarily extend to death as well as to injury, and
for the benefit of all who are engaged in maritime activity, employees as
issue in those cases was the power of Congress to delegate to state law-making
authority power to enact rules of decision for cases falling within the admiralty
jurisdiction and in which the traditional admiralty rule and the state rules were
inconsistent. The issue in the death-cause case would be the propriety of judicial
granting of relief under circumstances expressly carved out of a legislative enact-
ment granting the same relief in a category of circumstances which would, but for
the express exception, cover those in which the court wishes to act. The Death on
the High Seas Act does not attempt to force the federal courts to look to state
wrongful death acts. The decision to look to those acts is a judge-made choice.
53 Note that the instant case could have been decided on narrower grounds. The
plaintiff attempted to get the case out of maritime jurisdiction on the theory that
a dam is an extension of land. Instant case at 318 n.7; Brief for Petitioner p. 19.
The plaintiff also argued that the instant case came within the "twilight zone" rule
of Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959). Brief for Petitioner
p. 26. See comment on the instant case after circuit court decision, 72 HAnv. L. Ev.
1363, 1368-69 (1959). The Court obviously did not wish to limit the scope of its
decision. See instant case at 338 (Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting). Note also the
Tungus dissenters joining the Court in the instant case under the "compulsion" of
Tungus. Instant case at 321.
54 The declaration in the Hess concurrence by the four Tungus dissenters that
they "note their continued disagreement with the ruling in The Tungus, and reserve
their position as to whether it should be overruled," instant case at 322, is a clear
invitation to litigants to reopen Tungus-Hess.
55 Compare the tenor of the opinions and the votes of the Court in Caldarola v.
Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1947), with Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953),
and Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959). The
dialectic of these cases formed the basis for plaintiff's argument in Romero v. Inter-
national Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), that federal question juris-
diction could be found in the case of a maritime negligence action despite a long,
unbroken line of early authority supporting the mutual exclusiveness of admiralty
and general federal question jurisdiction. See id. at 377-78. Compare the discussion
in Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in instant case at 324-28.
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well as employer-owners. 56 This is not to say that the Court would or
could fly in the teeth of a congressional determination to abdicate authority
in admiralty to the states.5 7  But the very ambiguity of the Death on the
High Seas Act leaves room for a practical judicial balancing of concerns
within the traditional premises of the federal system. Mr. Justice Harlan
has flatly couched the problem as one of Supreme Court accommodation of
national and local interests. 58 Even Mr. Justice Stewart, who holds the
most expansive view of state competence yet articulated on the Court, has
insisted upon the ultimate power and obligation of the Court to do that
balancing. 59 But inherent in this recognition of the issue as a problem in
working federalism there should be a release from any hampering concepts
drawn from the Death on the High Seas Act as such. It would be anom-
alous to find in a statute whose most precise ascertainable purpose was to
enable the adjustment of national and local policies an impediment to
making the optimal practical adjustment which judicial wisdom can
engineer.
The point at which the competing interests are likely to be reconciled
is one which will repudiate Hess and probably also the Tungus dictum
relegating questions of contributory negligence and assumption of risk to
state statutes. Some elements of state death law are certain to continue to
be recognized. Statutory distribution schemes seem most clearly "local"
matters, both because of their implications in the family law and welfare
spheres and because of their negligible effect upon the actual conduct of
maritime affairs-the sphere of federal concern.60  Periods of limitations 61
and, perhaps, liability limits fall in the same dimension. These aspects of
death recovery are of the type which do appear to have been considered by
the Congress which enacted the territorial waters exemption; 62 they are
most traditionally assimilable to admiralty (which in the event of a judi-
cially-created federal death right would presumably have looked to state
law for such matters) 63 and are least disruptive of maritime uniformity.
56 See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104-05 (1946) (Chief Justice
Stone, dissenting, remarks on the need for a uniform law for the protection of seamen,
whose employment is subject to peculiar risks and conditions); Note, The General
Maritime Law vs. State Law in Maritime Cases: Which, When, and Why?, 50 Nw.
U.L. REv. 677 (1955) (on the shipping industry's being entitled to rely on a uniform
law).
57 See note 52 supra.
58 Instant case at 330-31 (dissent).
59 This, if anything, must be the meaning of his reservation of power in the
Court to decline to enforce state statutes which are too far offensive to traditional
admiralty rules. Instant case at 320.
60 Even the Tungus dissenters appear willing to accept this much state law.
See 358 U.S. at 609.
61 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921) ; The Harrisburg, 119 U.S.
199 (1886); cf. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224, 228-29
(1958).
6 See 59 CONG. REc. 4484-85 (1920) (remarks of Representatives Volstead and
Mann).
6
3 While not regarding itself as strictly bound by state statutes of limitations,
admiralty in the application of laches has traditionally looked to them for enlighten-
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Perhaps in some instances the creation of peculiar incidents of liability
based upon statutes or relationships of the decedent and defendant, where
these have ramifications of especial local significance, may be within state
competence.64 But a condition of the law under which, as in Hess, the
primary consequence of responsibility attaches or does not attach to the
same complex of human acts depending on the fortuity of death or non-
death is unlikely to persist. The reasoning which underlay a unanimous
Supreme Court's recent assertion of the "Court's function in declaring the
general maritime law, free from inappropriate common-law concepts" 65
carries over to require the application, in death cases as well, of a federal
standard of care.
BANKRIUPTCY-PATIcopAION LOAN 0LAm op SmAT&I Busi-
NEss ADMnISTmTION DENID GOVERNMNTAL PRIoiTY SincE
BAx Woim Aso ST-rA IN PROCEEDS
In anticipation of a Small Business Act 1 loan to debtor a participation
agreement was executed between bank and the Small Business Administra-
tion, providing, inter alia, that proceeds and losses would be shared between
the parties according to their respective interests in the loan: twenty-five
per cent bank, seventy-five per cent SBA. The Administration purchased
its interest by payment in advance to bank; then the loan was made by bank
ment See Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 533 (1956); The Key
City, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 653, 660 (1871); GIL.moE & BLAcK, ADmnzAITY §§ 9-80,
9-82 (1957); 107 U. PA. L. REv. 255, 257 (1958).
64 There has been repeated judicial recognition, especially, of the peculiar local
interest in the employment relationship. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532 (1935). And see the several opinions in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt; 320 U.S. 430 (1943). Nothing was made of this aspect of the statute involved
in Hess, although the opportunity for argument directed to special state concern was
present. Probably the argument was not made because the application of the statute
on the facts of the case clearly went beyond the immediate employment relationship.
See note 7 supra. Note that the employments typically involved in the Hess-type
case will be those of dockworkers, repairmen, etc., having a local character. Em-
ployment relations within the field of maritime activity itself will usually be covered
by a relevant federal statute-the Jones Act in the case of seamen, the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in the case of most shipside workers.
There must be distinguished from this kind of relationship, grounded upon socio-
institutional fact the kind of merely conceptual relationship involved in Kermarec v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959) ("licensee"-"invitee' dis-
tinctions for purposes of duty of property owner). A third dimension of relationships
involve legal concepts which have independent significance for the control of other,
independent affairs between the parties-agency doctrines, for example. See Cal-
darola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1947).
65 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, supra note 64, at 630.
172 Stat. 384 (1958), 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1958). The statute is a reenactment,
with certain amendments, of the Small Business Act of 1953, ch. 282, 67 Stat. 232.
The relevant loan provisions are found in Small Business Act § 2[7] (a), 72 Stat. 387
(1958), 15 U.S.C. §636(a) (1958).
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to debtor who executed a note payable to bank.2  Subsequent to filing of
an involuntary petition in bankruptcy 3 against debtor, the note was as-
signed to SBA who filed a claim for the unpaid balance 4 and asserted
for seventy-five per cent thereof 5 the priority given debts due the United
States by section 64(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act.6 The referee found
that SBA was a separate legal entity not entitled to the governmental
priority.7 The district court affirmed,8 but on the reasoning that SBA
was not a creditor at the date of bankruptcy. The Tenth Circuit, affirming,
refused priority on yet another ground: since SBA under the participation
contract must pay to bank its pro rata share of any proceeds of the claim,
upholding SBA's contention would in effect extend priority to a private
creditor in the name of the priority granted the United States. Small
Business Administration v. McClellan, 272 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1959), cert.
granted, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3305 (U.S. April 19, 1960) (No. 729).
Section 64(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act gives a fifth priority to
"debts owing to any person, including the United States, who by the laws
of the United States in [sic] entitled to priority. . . ." The statutory
language incorporates Revised Statutes section 3466,9 which provides:
"Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, . .
the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied," and by operation
of 64(a) (5) this first satisfaction otherwise enjoyed is relegated to the
lower fifth-priority position within the bankruptcy scheme.' 0 The cases
2 Apparently the debt was not secured. Upon hindsight it is interesting to note
the language of the statute: "All loans made under this subsection shall be of such
sound value or so secured as reasonably to assure repayment." Small Business Act
§ 2[7] (a) (7), 72 Stat. 387 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 636(a) (7) (1958).
3 The estate was valued at approximately $19,000; $43,000 in claims were filed.
Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 272 F.2d 143, 144 (10th Cir. 1959).
Expenses of administration were estimated at $6,500, Brief for Appellant, p. 3, such
expenses having a first priority. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (1), 52 Stat. 874 (1938),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1) (1958). See note 10 infra.
4 The balance was $16,788.42. Small Business Administration v. McClellan,
. upra note 3, at 144. As to claims in bankruptcy see Bankruptcy Act §§ 57, 63, 52
Stat. 866, 873 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§93, 103 (1958).5 Although the court's opinion is uninformative on the point, briefs of both
parties make it clear that priority was asked for this amount only. Brief for
Appellant, pp. 3-4, Brief for Appellee, p. 4, Small Business Administration v. Mc-
Clellan, 272 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1959). As to the reason why priority was not
sought for the remaining 25%, see note 26 infra and accompanying text.
6 52 Stat. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (1958).
7 In the Matter of Byquist, Bankruptcy No. 1138-B-1, D. Kan., June 26, 1958.
The conclusion seems to be based on the fact that the SBA could, through its
Administrator, sue and be sued, buy and sell property, and enter into contracts. These
powers, the engaging in activities similar to private business, and an absence of an
affirmative grant of the priority in the Small Business Act led the referee to the con-
clusion that the governmental priority did not extend to the SBA. But see text
at notes 18 and 19 infra.
8 In the Matter of Byquist, 168 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1958).
9 REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958) ; see 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
ff 64.502 (14th ed. 1956). See also Rtv. STAr. §§ 3467, 3468 (1875), as amended, 31
U.S.C. §§ 192, 193 (1958).
10 It is clear that the status of the priority in bankruptcy is controlled by the
Bankruptcy Act, not § 3466. Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety
Co., 224 U.S. 152 (1912); United States v. Kaplan, 74 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1935);
3 CoLLIER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 64.502. The government's fifth-priority position
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traditionally abound in statements that section 3466 is to be construed
liberally 1 in order to effectuate its purpose of securing "an adequate
revenue to sustain the public burdens and discharge the public debts." 12
Such language is still not uncommon,13 even though the federal taxation
program lends a hollow ring to its logic today; but certain restrictions on
the working of the statute have developed.
Suspension by Congress itself of section 3466 has been effected in only
two cases: 14 the Federal Control Act of 1918 15 declared that the govern-
ment was to be treated as a common carrier during its operation of the
railroads after World War 1,16 and section 3(a) of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation Act 7 expressly made section 3466 inoperative as to
certain debts due the RFC. The courts, however, have carved out three
additional exceptions. First, if the debt is owed to a governmental agency
is not as low as it might seem since the United States shares in the fourth priority
for taxes, Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (4), 52 Stat. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (4)
(1958), and since the third priority is applicable only if there is criminal, fraudulent
or other conduct by the bankrupt barring his discharge and if the creditors aid in
bringing this to light. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 32(c), 33, 64(a) (3), 52 Stat. 850,
851, 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 32(c), 33, 104(a) (3) (1958). However,
a substantial part of the estate is usually needed to meet the expenses of administra-
tion, which have a first priority. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (1), 52 Stat. 874 (1938),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1) (1958); see MAcLAcHLAN, BANK'RUpTcy § 155,
at 153 (1956), where the author states that nearly 40% of the estates were exhausted
for this purpose in the fiscal years 1952-55. Some commentators have voiced dis-
satisfaction with governmental priorities generally, arguing that there is an incon-
sistency in their presence within the context of federal bankruptcy legislation.
MAcLACEiLAN, op. cit. mpra § 155, at 153-54; Salter, Priority Accorded the Sov-
ereign in Bankruptcy: the American and British Views, 63 Com. LJ. 354 (1958);
cf. Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: the Pernicious Career
of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954). MacLachlan points to
foreign statutes, many of which restrict the sovereign priority to taxes within a
specified period. E.g., Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, §§ 33(1) (a), 151
(one year tax priority). Congress has taken a step in this direction, the House
passing a bill which would place a three-year limit on the fourth priority for federal
and state taxes. H.R. 2236, 86th Cong., Ist Sess., § 2 (1959). The bill further excludes
taxes not within this three-year limit from the fifth priority. See 34 REF. J. 16-17
(1960).
11 E.g., Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 102, 134 (1838).
32 United States v. State Bank, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 35 (1832).
13 See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25,,27-28 (1952).
14 Congress would appear generally satisfied with the bankruptcy priority. A
judicial attempt to render it meaningless was made in Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315
(1925), where the Court decided that the United States was not a person entitled
to the priority which was then contained in § 64(b) (5). 30 Stat. 563 (1898). This
action was quickly negatived by the Act of May 27, 1926, § 15, 44 Stat. 666: "[The
debts to have priority are] . . . (7) debts owing to any person who by the laws
of . . . the United States is entitled to priority: Provided, that the term 'person'
as used in this section shall include . . . the United States. . . " The relevant
statutory language has not been altered in substance since that time. See Bank-
ruptcy Act § 64(a) (5), 52 Stat. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (1958).
15 Federal Control Act § 10, 40 Stat. 456 (1918).
16 See Mellon v. Michigan Trust Co., 271 U.S. 236 (1926) (equity receivership),
in which the Court read the language of the statute as prohibiting assertion of the
governmental priority.
1762 Stat. 262 (1948), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §603(a) (1958). The opposite
approach was taken in § 4(e) of the Commodity Credit Corporation Act in which the
Corporation was expressly granted the priority. 62 Stat. 1071 (1948), 15 U.S.C.
§ 714b(e) (1958).
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created in corporate form, the agency is apparently treated like any private
corporation for purposes of the application of the statute; 18 however, if
the agency is noncorporate (as is the SBA) the cases consistently hold
that the United States' priority is effective. 19 Second, in United States v.
Guaranty Trust Co.,20 the Supreme Court found section 3466 inapplicable
to debts arising under the Transportation Act of 1920: 21 despite the absence
of statutory language negativing the priority, its allowance was held in-
compatable with the purposes of that act, and thus not intended by
Congress. 22  Although such a rationale might also have been arguable in
the instant case, an examination of legislative history reveals that Congress
has foreclosed this analysis by rejection of a bill which in its initial form
would have eliminated the section 3466 priority as to debts due the SBA 23
In the final class of judicial exception, the United States is a creditor in
name only, an agent collecting the claim for others who will assume the
beneficial enjoyment of it. In Nathanson v. NLRB 24 the Labor Relations
Board sought to assert the governmental priority for employees' claims
against a bankrupt employer under a backpay order. The Court rejected
the assertion, saying: "It does not follow that because the Board is an
agency of the United States, any debt owed it is a debt owing the United
18 Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp.,
258 U.S. 549, 570 (1922) (bankruptcy); United States v. Wood, 290 Fed. 109
(2d Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 263 U.S. 680 (1923) (bankruptcy); cf. RFC v. J. G.
Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81 (1941). But ef. United States Grain Corp. v. Phillips,
261 U.S. 106, 113 (1923); Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 523,
524 (1940).
1 9 E.g., United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940); Korman v.
FHA, 113 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (Vinson, J.). This rather mechanical dis-
tinction has been criticized by writers in the field. See 3 CoLLIER, op. cit. supra
note 9, 64.502, at 2181; NADLER, TiE LAW oF BANKRUPTCY § 205 (1948).
20 280 U.S. 478 (1930).
21 Transportation Act § 210, ch. 235, 41 Stat. 946 (1920).
22 "To have given priority to debts due the United States pursuant to Title II,
would have defeated the purpose of Congress. It not only would have prevented
the reestablishment of railroad credit among bankers and investors, but it would
even have seriously impaired the market value of outstanding railroad securities.
It would have deprived the carriers of the credit commonly enjoyed from supplymen
and others; would have seriously embarrassed the carriers in their daily operations;
and would have made necessary a great enlargement of their working capital ...
The entire spirit of the Act makes clear the purpose that the rule leading to such
consequences should not be applied." United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280
U.S. 478, 485 (1930). But see United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941), in
which § 3466 as applicable in a state equity receivership action was found not incon-
sistent with the National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified in scattered
sections of 12, 41, 48, 49 U.S.C.). "The purpose of Title I was not the strengthening
of the general credit of property owners, but the stimulation of the building trades
by affording assurances to lending institutions in order to induce them to make
loans for property improvements." Id. at 433.
23 S. 3319, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 104 CONG. REc. 2125 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1958);
see Hearing Before a Subcommittee on Credit Needs of Small Business of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 553 (1958).
As enacted the bill made provision only for the subordination of United States
security interests to state tax liens where such interests would be subordinated
in the hands of a private party under applicable state law. 72 Stat. 396, 15 U.S.C.
§646 (1958).
24 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
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States within the meaning of R.S. § 3466. . . . There is no function
here of assuring the public revenue. The beneficiaries of the claims are
private persons .. . , 25 It was upon this ground that the Tenth
Circuit found the priority inapplicable in the present case.
The bankruptcy rule that the rights of claimants are determined at the
date of filing of the petition 2 6 prevented the SBA, who took the assignment
after that date, from relying on its postassignment interest as the basis for
a fifth priority. Its argument, therefore, was that it in fact owned seventy-
five per cent of the claim irrespective of assignment, by virtue of its purchase
under the participation contract.27 While the district court rejected this
contention on rather formalistic grounds, emphasizing that the SBA had
contracted with the bank and not the bankrupt,28 the government's position
in this regard appears to have merit. The certificate received in return for
the purchase, the interest in a share of proceeds, the duty to bear a portion
of losses, and the right to demand assignment of the note at any time are
persuasive evidence that the Administration was the beneficial owner of a
part of the claim and that as to this part the bank was acting merely as a
collecting agent. It was perhaps in recognition of the force of this argu-
ment that the court of appeals preferred to place its holding on the
Nathanson rationale. In any event, it is clear that the appellate decision as
grounded is equally applicable to participation-loan cases in which an assign-
ment is made before the date of filing. And since two-thirds of all SBA
loans are made in participation,2 9 the impact of the case upon the priority
of the SBA is considerable.
The court's conclusion, however, is dubious. Not only did it overlook
an expression of congressional understanding that section 3466 was to be
operative regarding debts owing the Administration, 0 but it neglected
to consider other factors relevant to the appropriate application of that
25 Id. at 27, 28.
2 6 United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200, 207 (1939) ; 3 COLnR, op. cit. Mtpra
note 9, 1164.502, at 2180; MOORE, DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 805 (1955). It
is also well settled that a prebankruptcy assignment to the government (barring
other reasons for disqualification) will give the United States the § 3466 priority
even though the assignor had no such right. Korman v. FHA, 113 F.2d 743 (D.C.
Cir. 1940); Wagner v. McDonald, 96 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1938); see United States
v. Marxen, supra at 207; cf. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940);
Howe v. Sheppard, 12 Fed. Cas. 672 (C.C.D. Me. 1835).
27 See Brief for Appellant, pp. 6-9, instant case.
28 "The note executed by the bankrupt was made payable to the bank, the Small
Business Administration paid over its money to the bank, the bank paid the total
amount of the loan to the bankrupt, and all payments on the loan were to be made
to the bank. The bank was the sole payee. By the very terms of its own form
Small Business Administration was not made a party-lender. The only connection
it had with the loan was by virtue of its agreement to participate which was made,
not with the bankrupt so as to obligate him to the Small Business Administration,
but with the bank." In the Matter of Byquist, 168 F. Supp. 483, 486 (D. Kan.
1958).
29 MaCallum, Loans by the Sinall Business Administration, 13 Bus. LAW. 349,
350 (1958).
30 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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section. Although Nathanson, its key authority,3' is admittedly similar to
the instant case in that the SBA was acting in part as an intermediary for
a private party, the case also exhibits substantial differences. Initially
there is a distinction in terms of the very purpose of section 3466, the
satisfaction of the public revenues. The total absence of this justification
for the priority was emphasized in Nathanson; 32 it is, however, clearly
present here.33 Equally important is the contrast between the respective
interests of the United States in that part of the proceeds which would pass
to private parties in the two situations. It is difficult to see how priority
would further the ends of the Taft-Hartley Act 34 -the amelioration of
labor-management relations and, more immediately, the prevention of unfair
labor practices. Presumably application of section 3466 would neither
impose additional sanctions upon the bankrupt employer, nor significantly
increase the desire of employees to take advantage of the multiple benefits
of the federal labor program. Of course, making employees whole is con-
sistent with the policy of the Taft-Hartley Act and from this aspect the
priority would serve some function; but it was not inexplicable that the
Nathanson Court should find this governmental interest relatively un-
substantial. 35 In the SBA cases, however, the interest of the United
States regarding that part of the proceeds passed on to banks is arguably
much greater. The Small Business Act expresses a preference for partic-
ipation loans. 36 Since banks will tend to recover a greater portion of their
investment with priority than they would without, its recognition makes
participation loans naturally more attractive to banks and effectuates the
statutory program. In view of this double aspect of federal interest, then,
it would seem that the court's extension of the Nathanson doctrine-itself
a limitation of a statute which has received consistently liberal construction
3 1 In addition, one sentence was taken from the opinion in United States v.
Marxen, 307 U.S. 200, 206 (1939), which appears to support the result here reached:
"this principle of [liberal] construction [of §3466] is subject to the limitation that
the generality of the language of the section is restricted by the purpose to grant
priority to the United States, only. . . ." But the Supreme Court was there
speaking in the context of a post-bankruptcy assignment to the FHA-a situation
in which the United States had no claim as of the time of bankruptcy-and it is
questionable that the Court's word "only" has the significance attached to it by the
Tenth Circuit. The court in the instant case further viewed priority as defeating
the bankruptcy theme of equitable distribution among general creditors, since it
would "prefer the Bank over the other private creditors. . . ." Instant case at
145-46. But this conclusion would appear dependent upon the resolution of the
principal inquiry as to the effect of the priority provision. See Nathanson v. NLRB,
344 U.S. 25, 32 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
3 2 Nathanson v. NLRB, supra note 31, at 27-28.
33 The SBA has indicated that recognition of the priority allows recovery of
large sums of money that would otherwise be lost to the government. Hearing, supra
note 23, at 553.
34Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1958), as amended, 73 Stat. 519, U.S.C.A. §§ 153,
158, 159, 160, 164, 186, 187, 401-531 (Supp. 1959).
35 Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 28 (1958).
36 Small Business Act § 2[7] (a) (2), 72 Stat. 387 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 636(a) (2)
(1958).
RECENT CASES
in favor of the government-is a step to be taken only with cognizance of
the differences between the NLRB and the SBA situations. That the
distinctions are sufficiently material to call for a different result is at least
arguable. Certainly they deserved consideration in the disposition of the
instant case.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FRAt.urrnaNT INDUCEMENT HEI L ARBI-
TRABLE UNDER UNITED STATES ARBITRATION ACT IN Dvr mysIT Sum
ON CONTRACT EVIDENCING INTERSTATE COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION
Plaintiff buyer, a Massachusetts corporation, brought a diversity action
against defendant seller, a New York corporation, in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. It alleged that
defendant, by fraudulently misrepresenting the quality of certain woolen
fabrics, had induced plaintiff to contract for their purchase, and that the
goods, for which plaintiff had paid, proved after delivery to be of inferior
quality. Plaintiff claimed to have rescinded the contract, which-entered
into in New York and calling for shipment by the seller from New York to
Boston-provided by its terms that "any complaint, controversy, or ques-
tion" which might arise "with respect to this contract" would be referred to
arbitration.' Pursuant to the United States Arbitration Act,2 defendant
moved for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration, which was denied by
the district court on the grounds that if plaintiff had justifiably voided the
contract, the arbitration clause which it contained was also voided. The
question of the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, it held, must be
preliminarily decided by the court before a stay could be granted, since
the issue of fraudulent inducement of a contract could not be submitted to
arbitration as a "controversy thereafter arising out of such contract." 3 On
appeal the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the enforceability of the
arbitration clause must be determined by federal, not local, law, and that
under the Arbitration Act the agreement contained in the arbitration
clause was severable from the remainder of the contract and voidable only
if it-and not the contract as a whole-had been fraudulently induced.
Finding no allegation of fraudulent inducement of the agreement, the circuit
court ordered the court below to grant the stay. Robert Lawrence Co. v.
1 The arbitration clause read as follows: "Any complaint, controversy, or ques-
tion which may arise with respect to this contract that cannot be settled by the
parties thereto, shall be referred to arbitration. If the controversy concerns the
condition or quality of merchandise it shall be referred to the Mutual Adjustment
Bureau of the cloth and garment trades pursuant to the rules and regulations
thereof. All other controversies shall be submitted to the American Arbitration
Association." Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404
(2d Cir. 1959).
29 U.S.C. §3 (1958).
3 Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404 (2d Cir.
1959).
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Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted,
28 U.S.L. WEEK 3259 (U.S. March 7, 1960) (No. 659).
In response to growing public demand for a method of settling disputes
which would be faster and cheaper than litigation,4 and following closely the
model of a New York statute passed five years before,5 Congress in 1925
enacted the United States Arbitration Act.6 The legislative history of the
federal act,7 and comment contemporaneous with its passage,8 indicate that
Congress intended to erect the statute on two constitutional bases: first, on
the power of Congress to prescribe the jurisdiction and procedures of the
federal courts,9 and second, on the power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce 10 and admiralty." The act itself reflects this intention.
12
4 See Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. Rev. 265
& n.2 (1926).
5 New York Laws, ch. 275 (1920), now N.Y. Civ. PRac. ACT §§ 1448-69. See
S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924). The 1920 New York Arbitration
Act was the first of its kind enacted in the United States. The history of arbitra-
tion in this country and in England is discussed at length in Kulukundis Shipping
Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-85 (2d Cir. 1942), and Park Constr.
Co. v. Independent School Dist., 209 Minn. 182, 189, 296 N.W. 475, 478 (1941)
(dissenting opinion). And see generally, Baum & Pressman, The Enforcement of
Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts (pts. 1-2), 8 N.Y.U.L.
IEv. 238, 428 (1930-31); Fraenkel, The New York Arbitration Law, 32 COLUm.
L. REv. 623 (1932); Poor, Arbitration Under The Federal Statute, 36 YALE L.J.
667 (1927); Wheless, Arbitration As a Judicial Process of Law, 30 W. VA. L. REv.
209 (1924).
6Act of February 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883. In 1947, the act was repealed
and reenacted in substantially identical codified form. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958). No
substantive amendment was intended. H.R. REP. No. 255, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947). The 1925 act was passed with virtually no opposition. Bernheimer, The
United States Arbitration Act, 3 DOCKET 2928 (1925). Over a hundred organiza-
tions supported the bill, which had been drafted by the Committee on Commerce,
Trade, and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association and was jointly
sponsored by the New York State Chamber of Commerce and the American Bar
Association. See H.R. R P. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
7 "The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible agreements for arbi-
tration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the juris-
diction or [sic] admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal
courts. . . . The matter is properly the subject of Federal action. Whether an
agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of procedure to be
determined by the law court in which the proceeding is brought and not one of
substantive law to be determined by the law of the forum in which the contract is
made. Before such contracts could be enforced in the Federal courts, therefore,
this law is essential. . . . The remedy is founded also upon the Federal control
over interstate commerce and over admiralty. The control over interstate commerce
reaches not only the actual physical interstate shipment of goods but also contracts
relating to interstate commerce." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
The contracts to which the bill applies are defined in § 1 of the act. S. REP. No.
536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
8 Bernheimer, supra note 6, at 2928; Cohen & Dayton, supra note 4, at 274-75;
Poor, supra note 5, at 667.
9 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
20 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
"U.S. CoxsT. art. III, § 2.
12 Sections 1 and 2 indicate the legislative purpose to make use of congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce: "'commerce', as herein defined, means
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations. . . ." 9 U.S.C. § 1
(1958). "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving .commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
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Soon after the Arbitration Act was passed, the argument was made that
insofar as it prescribed procedure, it could properly be applied by federal
courts in any action over which they had jurisdiction (presumably whether
interstate commerce or admiralty was involved or not) 13 and, further,
that insofar as it purported to regulate interstate commerce, it might be
enforceable in state as well as federal courts.14 As yet the Supreme Court
has not ruled on the question of whether state courts are bound to enforce
the act, but if Congress so intended, clearly both state and federal courts
would be bound.' 5 The potential double basis of the statute is calculated to
raise extremely difficult questions of its interpretation and, under the
doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,'6 of the effect which is to be given
it: 17 insofar as it is founded on congressional power to prescribe procedure
in the federal courts, it may be tagged "procedural," but insofar as its basis
was intended to be the commerce and maritime powers, it can be regarded
as of "substantive" purport. The substance-procedure distinction here cuts
at problems on two levels: substance versus procedure for purposes of
congressional intention vel non to limit the operation of the act to litigation
in the federal courts; and, assuming that Congress meant it to be so
limited, substance versus procedure for purposes of determining under Erie
its application to cases where federal jurisdiction is premised solely on
diversity.' 8 This latter determination, too, would presumably be couched
arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." 9 U.S.C. §2 (1958). Subsequent sections prescribe procedures
to be followed in enforcing the arbitration agreements validated by § 2. For exam-
ple, § 3 provides: "If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing
for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment. . . ." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1958). Section 4 provides for a petition for an order
compelling arbitration to the federal court which would have jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter of the controversy were it not for the agreement to arbitrate. Congress
was clearly aware of the double constitutional foundation of the act. See note 7
supra.
13 Cohen & Dayton, mipra note 4, at 277-78.
14 Id. at 277.15 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292
U.S. 230 (1934); cf. General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908). See instant
case at 407, where the court by way of dictum declares that state courts are bound
by the Arbitration Act. But see note 37 infra.
16304 U.S. 64 (1938).
17The Arbitration Act was enacted 13 years before Erie was decided, and
Congress made no allowance for the doctrine which was yet to come. The act was
simply copied from that of New York, and New York was not vexed with problems
of federalism within its own borders. Within this context, arbitration was regarded
as a procedural, not substantive, matter. See H.R. REP. 96, mipra note 7.
18 Regarding the act "procedural" for Erie purposes, see cases cited note 23
infra. And see Parry v. Bache, 125 F.2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Pioneer Trust &
Say. Bank v. Screw Mach. Prod. Co., 73 F. Supp. 578, 580 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
Cf., Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924). Calling it "sub-
stantive," see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Kentucky River
Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111, 117-18 (6th Cir. 1953); Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough
Bros., 165 F.2d 276, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1947).
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in terms of the national legislative intent 19 unless-reaching the unlikely
conclusion that Congress had meant to encompass all district court diversity
actions 20 and, moreover, that when so applied the Arbitration Act was
controlling on matters of "substance" to which the federal commerce power
did not extend-the Court were prepared to face the question whether Erie
was in fact the ultimate constitutional decision which Mr. Justice Brandeis'
opinion sought to make it. 21 Clearly, however, the act was "intended" to
be both substantive and procedural : 22 sections 1 and 2 substantively vali-
date certain arbitration clauses; the enforcement sections which follow, e.g.,
19 Compare Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949),
holding that FED. R. Civ. P. 23 did not conflict with a state statute prescribing the
posting of security for costs in certain shareholders' derivative actions.
20 It was contended, prior to Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956),
that Congress had by the Arbitration Act authorized the enforcement of arbitration
clauses in all contracts which come to be the subject of suit in federal courts,
whether or not related to admiralty or interstate commerce. Sturges & Murphy,
Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under The United States Arbitra-
tion Act, 17 LAw & Co=aEmP. PROB. 580, 587-89 (1952).
21 Compare Mr. Justice Brandeis' analysis ("If only a question of statutory
construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so
widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course
pursued [under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)] has now been made
clear. . . ." 304 U.S. at 777-78), with Mr. Justice Reed's concurring opinion.
Id. at 90. Erie, of course, can be made to stand on grounds of less than absolute
constitutional power. See judiciary Act of 1789 § 34, Rav. STAT. § 721 (1875), as
amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958). Nevertheless, the constitutional base of that
holding has been reasserted: Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 114 (1945)
(dissenting opinion); cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956).
Compare the more careful statement of Erie in Mishkin, The Variousness of
"Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State
Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rav. 797, 799 (1957): that "the particular sub-
ject matter involved was beyond the law-making competence of the federal courts;
that the area was one where state law governed of its own authority, and the mere
grant of jurisdiction to adjudicate a case did not carry with it the power to declare
an independent 'general' rule displacing that authority." Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., supra at 208, flatly places his interpre-
tation of the Arbitration Act as reaching only federal-question actions upon severe
constitutional doubts as to the power of Congress to make the act applicable to
diversity cases not involving admiralty or commerce: "Since the United States
Arbitration Act of 1925 does not obviously apply to diversity cases, in the light
of its terms and the relevant interpretive materials, avoidance of the constitutional
question is for me sufficiently compelling to lead to a construction of the Act as not
applicable to diversity cases." Without discussing the commerce power, justice
Frankfurter apparently assumed that not only must § 3 be read in light of § 2, but
that § 2 must reciprocally be read in light of the subsequent procedural enforcement
provisions: §2 can be judicially implemented only by invocation of §§3 and 4,
which clearly apply only to federal, not state, courts; if not applicable to state courts,
the statute is not applicable to cases in federal courts solely by diversity (whether
involving interstate contracts or not)-in short, no extension of federal judicial
competence beyond the "procedure" applicable to federal-question cases had been
effected. Note, however, that long before Erie gave rise to these subtleties, it was
taken for granted that the act applied to diversity cases in the district courts. See
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 4, at 267 & n.*, indicating that diversity cases must
have been considered as included, since diversity jurisdiction would have been one
of the sources of district court jurisdiction available under the otherwise-having-
jurisdiction clause of § 4 of the act. See note 12 supra.
22 Kochery, The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts,
39 CORNELL L.Q. 75, 95 (1953) ; Note, Commercial Arbitration and the Conflict of
Laws, 56 CoLuIS. L. Rav. 902, 906 (1956).
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sections 3 and 4, prescribe procedure. For some time the lower federal
courts were inclined to construe these latter enforcement sections as not
limited by the jurisdictional reference to contracts in maritime and inter-
state commerce in section 2,23 but in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.24 the
Supreme Court definitely held at least that Congress had not intended a
section 3 stay to be available in diversity cases involving contracts which
did not evidence interstate or maritime transactions.2 5 Inasmuch as the
difference between arbitration and judicial trial was sufficient to effect the
outcome of the controversy,26 the issue of forced submission to an arbitral
tribunal was "substantive" for Erie purposes and was ruled by the law of
the forum state.27 Bernhardt left open, however, the more significant
question as to whether the Arbitration Act was also "substantive" in the
sense of constituting a congressional invocation of its power to fix sub-
stantive rules of decision for cases involving "commerce." 28
This was the initial inquiry in the instant case. Here the subject-
matter requirement under the act and under the commerce clause was satis-
fied-there was in issue an arbitration clause contained in a contract evi-
dencing an interstate transaction. The significance for the future of the
Arbitration Act of whether it, or local law, was deemed to control 29 was
evident: to limit the act to federal question cases is (insofar as American
domestic transactions go) virtually to emasculate it, since there are relatively
few federal statutes under which one private individual is likely to sue
another on a claim grounded in a transaction which is also covered by an
23 Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. 1944) ;
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3, 5 (3d Cir. 1943); Wilson & Co.
v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364 (D. Neb. 1948). See also Tenney
Eng'r, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 453-54 n.15 (3d Cir. 1953)
(dictum). Compare Watldns v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945),
with Amalgamated Ass'n of Elec. Ry. Employees v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
192 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1951) (reversing former position). Cf. Shanferoke
Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 70 F.2d 297, 298 (2d Cir.), aff'd,
293 U.S. 449 (1935).
24 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
25 350 U.S. at 201-02. The Court's opinion was foreshadowed by Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427 (1953), 70 HARV. L. REv. 137, 138 n.298 (1956).26 Whether a given rule will "significantly affect the result of a litigation" has
been the Court's touchstone of substance-procedure under Erie in the bulk of its
post-1938 decisions. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). See
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). For a recent shift away from a pure "result" test
in the one area of judge-jury allocation of functions see Magenau v. Aetna Freight
Lines, 360 U.S. 273 (1959); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525
(1958).27 Provided that by the conflict-of-law rules of the forum state, that state would
choose its own law to control the transaction. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
28 But see discussion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, note 21
.rupra.
29 If the subject-matter requirement of the federal act were not met, New York
law would govern the issue of arbitrability. See Ross v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 236 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1956) (dictum); Badgett Mine Stripping
Corp. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 173 F. Supp. 425, 428-29 (M.D. Pa. 1959) ;
Jackson v. Atlantic City Elec. Co., 144 F. Supp. 551, 553 (D.N.J. 1956) ; Amalgamated
Growth Indus. v. Borcoa, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 17, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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arbitration agreement.30 On the other band, to invoke the full extent of
the commerce power in support of the act is to give it sweeping scope-
covering every interstate commercial contract. With evident consciousness
of the potential impact of its ruling, the Second Circuit found it "reasonably
clear that the Congress intended by the Arbitration Act to create a new
body of federal substantive law affecting the validity and interpretation of
arbitration agreements." 31 Even this cautious phrasing, because incom-
plete, comes close to overstatement. Congress did not think in terms of
"substantive" or "procedural" in the Erie context.82 But if its 1925 in-
tention may be recast post Erie, it is "reasonably dear" that what Congress
really sought to do was to create a new body of substantive law for cases
which would be litigated in federal courts.3 3 The statute was not regarded
in 1925 as "substantive" in 1925 terms.3 4 Even those who deemed it prob-
able that Congress had power to declare that arbitration agreements con-
nected with interstate commerce were enforceable in state courts neverthe-
less believed that the act, as passed, was applicable in federal courts only.
3 5
To so read the act today-to hold that section 2, although sustained by the
commerce power, was intended to be given effect only through the specified
procedures of the succeeding sections-is to take a middle position between
the poles of extreme restriction and extreme extension. That position
would make federally enforceable arbitration clauses in interstate com-
mercial contracts only in cases where (unless there exists an independent
ground of federal-question jurisdiction) the parties are diverse and the
subject matter in issue exceeds the $10,000 jurisdictional minimum .3  As
this, of course, was the case in Devonshire, that middle position is as much
as the case need hold. The court's further assumption that by its ruling
state court litigation, too, is brought under the sway of the act follows only
by a logic of constitutional power-grants-which are relevant solely insofar
as Congress actually exercises them.3 7 True, the alarming spectre of
30 Arbitration clauses in labor-management collective-bargaining agreements, ex-
pressly excepted from the scope of the Arbitration Act, § 1, are now enforceable in
the federal courts under Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) § 301 (a),
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958). See Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
31 Instant case at 406. Compare American Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson
County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1959).
32 See note 17 supra.
33 "The bill declares that [arbitration] agreements shall be recognized and enforced
by the courts of the United States." H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
34 See note 7 supra.
3 5 Cohen & Dayton, supra note 4, at 277.
3628 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Supp. 1959). See,
e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953) ; International Union of Furniture
Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); Gatliff
Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944); Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis
Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1933); In re Woerner, 31 F.2d 283 (2d
Cir. 1929) ; San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, 72 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd,
163 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1947). This limitation assumes special significance in view
of the recent corporation amendment to § 1332 of the Judicial Code, which should
significantly restrict diversity jurisdiction. 72 Stat. 415 (1958), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332
(Supp. 1959).
87 It could be argued that even though Congress did not actually intend to estab-
lish a rule for state courts, extension of the rule to include them is justified by the
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forum shopping, which in part motivated Erie, may in this new situation
agitate for the application of Devonshire to the state tribunals. But it is
certainly one thing for the national courts, in the interests of a concept of
federalism which reserves grass-roots law-making power to the states, to
refrain from policy decision in fields where the Constitution has not em-
powered Congress itself to act (this was decided in Erie), and quite another
for those national courts to find in congressional language apparently ad-
dressed to them alone a force of federal compulsion making arbitration-
enforcement mandatory on the states. Nor is the forum shopping menace
otherwise inevitable. That menace would arise only because, in a $10,000
interstate contract between diverse citizens X and Y, X could sue Y in a
state court in Y's state (thus forestalling removal under section 1441 of
the Judicial Code) 38 before Y's federal diversity action to compel arbitra-
tion 31 could be instituted. In this event, conceivably, the state court might
win a race to judgment as against any subsequent federal proceeding brought
by Y.40 Even this possibility could be obviated, however, by holding that
the specific grant of authority to a federal court to order compliance with
the terms of an agreement to arbitrate carried with it the power to stay
by injunction any pending state court proceedings, as "in aid of its juris-
diction" within the meaning of Judicial Code section 2283.41
But even in Devonshire the conclusion that federal law governs does
not dispose of the case. Before a federal judge can stay proceedings under
section 3 of the act, he must be satisfied that the issue which is the basis of
the suit-in the instant case, the fraudulent inducement of the contract-is
"referable to arbitration." 42 No issue is referable to arbitration if it is
within the exception specified by section 2 of the act: a written provision
to arbitrate shall be enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 43 Pointing out that the
manifest policy of Congress favoring arbitration. Instant case at 406-07. Nonethe-
less, the statute as an integrated whole is no clear mandate to state courts to enforce
arbitration clauses; it would be only if §§ 1 and 2 stood alone. To reach the conclu-
sion which the instant court assumes (at 407), Congress must be understood as
basing §§ 1 and 2 on the admiralty and commerce powers exclusively-but this Con-
gress dearly did not do.
38 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958). If X brought a state action in X's state, Y could
of course remove under § 1441(a).
39 Under § 4 of the Arbitration Act, 61 Stat. 669 (1947), as amended, 9 U.S.C.
§4 (1958).
40 See Fremont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., 86 F. Supp. 968 (D. Neb.
1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1950).
4128 U.S.C. §2283 (1958). The question was reserved in the district court
opinion in the Fremont Cake case, note 40 supra.
42 The relevant portion of 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1958) is quoted in note 12 supra. Whether
or not an agreement to arbitrate was made is not an issue referable to arbitration.
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 981 (2d Cir. 1942).
Fraudulent performance of a contract is clearly arbitrable. Almacenes Fernandez,
S.A. v. Golodetz, 148 F.2d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 1945).
439 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). Identical or similar exception clauses appear in the
arbitration statutes of fifteen states. See KELLoR, ARnrrRATioN iN AcTioN 217-346
(1941).
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act addresses itself solely to the enforceability of contract provisions to
arbitrate and not to the enforceability of contracts in general,44 the court
held that where the agreement to arbitrate, as separate from the sales agree-
ment which is the principal matter of the contract, is not alleged to have
been induced by fraud, it is not revocable.45 But this conclusion itself as-
sumes a competence in the federal court to decide what "grounds . . .
exist at law or in equity." 46 Indeed, the New York rule, the law of the
forum state-which by New York conflict-of-laws rules would be the
substantive rule here applicable to test the validity of the contract 47 -holds
to the contrary. In that jurisdiction, if the principal bargained portions
of a contract containing an arbitration clause have been induced by fraud,
so that the whole of the contract except the arbitration clause is voidable,
the arbitration clause falls with the rest.
4 8
Assuming that by the excepting language of section 2 Congress meant
to incorporate into the act legal rules relating to the revocation of contracts
as determinative of the validity of arbitration agreements, there are four
possible sources from which these rules might have been expected to be
drawn: 4 (1) the "general law" which, under Swift v. Tyson,"0 was then
44 Instant case at 409-10.
45 This view is in accord with that advanced by several writers. See Baum &
Pressman, supra note 5, at 440; Parsell, Arbitration of Fraud in the Inducement of
a Contract, 12 CORNELL L.Q. 351 (1927); Comment, 36 YALE L.J. 866 (1926). Cf.
Note, 16 N.Y.U.L. REv. 604 (1939). The experience of Swiss and German courts is
cited in support of the feasibility of arbitrating fraudulent inducement in Nussbaum,
The "Separability Doctrine" in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U.L. ELv.
609, 610-11 (1940). The instant court found the arbitration clause set forth in note 1
supra broad enough to encompass that issue.
46 It is evident that the instant court intended to create new federal rules to be
applied under the statute. Instant case at 409.
47 The contract was made in New York. See Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
280 N.Y. 135, 141, 19 N.E.2d 992, 995 (1939); Union Natl Bank v. Chapman, 169
N.Y. 538, 543, 62 N.E. 672, 673 (1902).
48 The leading case is Newburger v. Gold, 229 App. Div. 572, 243 N.Y. Supp. 51,
52, aff'd per curiam, 255 N.Y. 532, 175 N.E. 301 (1930). See Boudin v. Clarren,
289 N.Y. 724, 46 N.E.2d 346 (1942) ; Lipman v. Haeuser Shellac Co., 289 N.Y. 76,
79, 43 N.E.2d 817, 818 (1942) (dictum); Big W. Constr. Corp. v. Horowitz, 278
App. Div. 977, 105 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1951); Cheney Bros. v. Joroco Dresses, Inc.,
218 App. Div. 652, 219 N.Y. Supp. 96 (1926); Aqua Mfg. Co. v. H. Warshow &
Sons, Inc., 179 Misc. 949, 40 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct), aff'd, 266 App. Div. 718,
41 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1943). Cf., Gruen v. Carter, 173 Misc. 765, 18 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup.
Ct), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 712, 18 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1940) (jury trial granted on issue
of inducement by duress).
49 As Professor Mishkin has pointed out, supra note 21, at 802-10, where there
exists in the field of inquiry an active federal program or policy articulated by
Congress in the exercise of its substantive powers, but into which Congress has
chosen to incorporate state law, or may have chosen to incorporate state law, or
has left it to the courts to determine to what extent state law shall be incorporated,
the focus of inquiry is very different than under Erie. In the former dimension, the
question is one of congressional intent, insofar as ascertainable, see Reconstruction
Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946), or-where no legislative expression
provides enlightenment-of the judicially-sensed need for protection of the federal
program. Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940). Compare Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), with Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29
(1956).
5041 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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recognized in federal courts; 51 (2) the substantive law of the forum; (3)
the law already applied under the New York statute from which the federal
act was copied; 52 or (4) new law which federal judges might. from time
to time create by the exercise of an implied power conferred on them by
the Arbitration Act itself.53 It is most likely, in 1925, that (to the extent
that Congress considered the problem at all) Congress intended to in-
corporate the general law, or federal common law. But Erie erased that
brand of federal common law and substituted in its place for most purposes
the substantive law of the forum in which a federal district court sits. It
becomes necessary to decide then, for today, whether the Arbitration Act
should be construed as referring to local law for its legal-or-equitable-
grounds-of-avoidance, or as conferring law-making powers on federal
judges. The Devonshire court concluded that the congressional policy
favoring arbitration was sufficiently strong to warrant the latter construc-
tion, and that the formulation of special rules applicable to the act was an
appropriate exercise, presumably, of an inferred authority to complement
the act's purview.54 Although this emphasis on an overweening national
pro-arbitration program may be overdone,5 5 it is true that the Arbitration
Act, as regards that class of transaction to which it is applicable, constitutes
the legislative determination of one relatively narrow issue: the enforce-
ability in the federal courts of a written agreement to arbitrate. Where that
51 See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
614-21 (1953); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm.
L. RFv. 489 (1954).
5 2 In the five years between the enactment of the New York law and the federal
act, New York courts had no occasion to rule on the arbitrability of fraudulent in-
ducement. Later they did. See note 48 supra.
53 Compare Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Yet
as the statute refers to "such grounds as exist . . . for the revocation of any
contract"-and not simply "such grounds as may exist for revocation"--this reading
seems improbable. (Emphasis added.)
54 See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUm. L.
REv. 157, 184-96 (1953).
55 The very reign of Swift v. Tyson at the time of the Arbitration Act, and that
act's evident limitation to the federal tribunals, is indicative perhaps of a congressional
attitude which it is easy to mistake in retrospect. In 1925, if parties got into a
federal court, they got federal law. That federal law, as judge-made, was opposed
to arbitration. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1924)
(dictum). Congress, within the limits of what it felt its powers, set out to change
that law. With Erie, the problem to which it had addressed itself (so far as
domestic commerce is concerned) grew virtually moot-at least, it is impossible to
say that under Erie Congress would not have left arbitration problems to the states.
Compare Baum & Pressman, supra note 5, at 432, 433 n.134: "[S]lince it seems to
be generally agreed that the federal arbitration law purports to regulate the pro-
cedure in the inferior courts, it cannot be urged that it is a 'law regulating com-
merce.'" And note that the Arbitration Act, which predates Erie by thirteen years,
also predates NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), by
twelve: it would be naive to regard a 1925 Congress as intending to affect by the
phrase "involving commerce" all of the transactions which are likely to be caught
in the web in 1960. This last consideration has its primary impact, of course, on
the issue of what breadth to accord the "involving commerce" phrase itself, but also
may present a perspective which cautions against any tendency to regard the Arbitra-
tion Act as the kind of vitally active federal program of which the national labor
or the national transportation policies are exemplary.
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determination is subject to a single exception-a limitation incorporated
not in recognition of the particular local interests of the states but in re-
sponse to a general concept of consensual relations-it is reasonable to
measure the scope of the exception by a federal judge-made law. Two
additional considerations support this result. First, if the conclusion reached
earlier that the Arbitration Act does not compel state court enforcement be
accepted, minimization of forum shopping militates for a uniform federal
law which will assure, at least, that those parties who can be certain of an
available federal tribunal 56 will also be certain to have a single brand of
law govern their contract.57 Second, if local law controls, there exists the
difficulty of finding an appropriate local law to use. Since many jurisdic-
tions do not have arbitration legislation similar to the federal act,58 the
requirement of looking to state law will often leave the undesirable alter-
natives of (1) in fact creating a federal rule couched in a fiction-larded
opinion which purports to reason from state-law principles and conceals
its actual ratio decidendi, or (2) utilizing for decision of controversies in
the particular field of contracts-to-arbitrate legal doctrines developed with
regard to considerations operative in very different contexts. In view of
these obstacles to the employment of local law, and in the absence of any
compelling state interest in the premises, the Second Circuit's choice of a
federal common law to rule the excepting clause seems sound.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-RESTRICTIVE qOMPETrTivE BIDDING
AGREMENT SUSTAINED UNDER BR rISH RESTRICTIVE TRADE PraC-
TICES ACT OF 1956 UPoN FINDING THAT VOIDING AGREEmeNT
WOID TEND TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN EXPORT TRADE
Early in 1957 the Water-Tube Boilermakers' Association, an English
trade group composed of six major English manufacturers and designers
56 Depending upon the ability of a federal court to stay state proceedings under
§4 of the Arbitration Act and 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1958), see text at notes 38-41
mupra, diverse parties to contracts evidencing an interstate transaction will be more
or less sure of a federal forum for controversies over amounts in excess of the juris-
dictional monetary minimum. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1332(a) (Supp. 1959).
57 In light of the recent expansion of the base of in personam jurisdiction exempli-
fied by McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), see 108 U. PA. L.
REv. 131 (1959), it is likely that in any case involving an interstate transaction and
where the parties have the requisite diversity status, a choice of forums will be
available. To say that the federal court in each state must apply the law of that
state may well make differing rules applicable to the same contract. This last
danger will be negatived, of course, to the extent that state conflicts rules agree in
regarding the lex loci contracti as governing.
58 As of 1955, when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved their UNIFORm A ITRATIroN AcT, some fifteen states had statutes
similar to the United States Arbitration Act. See 9 U.L.A. 76. Through 1958 only
one state had adopted the uniform act. See 1958 HANDBOO: OF THE NATiONAL Cox-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFO1P STATE LAws 287 (1958).
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of land water-tube boilers and their components,1 adopted a set of rules
designed to control the contract terms and competitive bidding practices
of its members. Central to the institution was rule 5, establishing a com-
plex procedure whereby, if bids were solicited by a prospective purchaser
from more than one of the group,2 the association's president chose a
"selected member" on the basis of such factors as past performance in the
geographic region from which the order originated, relative current work
load and "customer preference." After a closed bid ballot by which solicited
members submitted competitive price quotations and specifications, fol-
lowed by an evaluative analysis-at a joint meeting--of all submitted prices
and price estimate elements,3 the "selected member" was permitted to meet
the "lowest evaluated price" and so win the contract award.4 The asso-
ciation's agreement was registered pursuant to the Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Act of 1956,5 and was referred by the Registrar to the Restrictive
Practices Court.6 Controversy was limited to the effect of rule 5, and
the association sought to justify its practices under the specific exemptions
of paragraphs (b), (d) and (f) of section 21(1) of the act.7 The court
rejected its contention that "public" benefits of a specific and substantial
1 The court made findings to the effect that there were "very few producers in
the industry." The six members who comprised the association produced approxi-
mately seventy-five per cent of the home market needs and some ninety per cent of
the boilers supplied to territories in which the agreement was operative. In re Water-
Tube Boilermakers' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 285, 303, 323 (1959). (Figures for boilers
sold in the United States and Europe were not included as this market was left
"open," apparently because American and European affiliations of the individual mem-
bers precluded any effective control over contracts in these regions. Furthermore,
the statistics do not accurately reflect the association members' hold on the market
for nuclear fission boilers.)
2 The rule was not brought into operation if only one of the member firms received
an inquiry or if an inquiry originated in a geographic region excepted from the cover-
age of the agreement
3 Bids and specifications submitted by members subsequently became common
property and could be utilized by other association members present as a base for
comparative cost studies for their own future price estimates.
4 The necessity for a contract-allocation procedure was explained by the associ-
ation as a function of factors peculiar to the boiler industry, which often involves
multimillion dollar single contracts whose performance requires as much as five years
of labor. As there are relatively few such contracts, a nonplanned distribution process
can obligate one producer beyond its immediate capacity while leaving other producers
wholly slack.
5 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68. Under the act, all restrictive agreements are screened
by a public official, the Registrar, who refers to the Restrictive Practices Court those
which he determines might infringe the provisions of the act. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the statutory scheme see Rhinelander, The British Restrictive Practices
Act, 46 VA. L. Rxv. 1 (1960).
6The Restrictive Practices Court was especially established in order to imple-
ment the act. It is comprised of five judges: three from the High Court of England,
one from the Court of Session of Scotland and one from the Supreme Court of
Northern Ireland. It also includes ten laymen who are appointed by the Crown.
A decision of the court on factual matters is final but an appeal on questions of law
lies in England to the Court of Appeal and finally to the House of Lords. See
ALBERY & FLETCHER-CooKE, MONOPOLIES AND RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRAcTIcEs 58, 65-66
(1956).
74 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, §§21(1) (b), (d), (f).
926 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.108
nature derived from the restrictions (under 21(1) (b)) 8 and that the
existence of a "preponderant" purchaser, the Central Electricity Generating
Board, required the creation of a "countervailing power" to facilitate nego-
tiation of fair terms for the supply of goods (under 21(1) (d) ),9 but did
find that the removal of the restrictions would be likely to cause a substan-
tial reduction in the export trade of the industry. 10 A gateway having thus
been found in 21(1) (f), the tribunal was required to strike a balance be-
tween this particular justification and "any detriment to the public" occa-
sioned by the challenged practices. Relying heavily on the "national
benefit resulting from the maintenance of exports which we anticipate if the
scheme continues," :" the court held that the association had discharged
its obligation of demonstrating that the restrictions brought about by the
operation of rule 5 were not "contrary to the public interest," and the
agreement was sustained. In re Water-Tube Boilermakers' Agreement,
L.R. 1 R.P. 285 (1959).
The instant case is the first in which the newly constituted Restrictive
Practices Court has had occasion to focus directly upon two critical por-
8 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 21 (1) (b). This subsection requires a finding that removal
of the restriction "would deny to the public as purchasers or consumers specific and
substantial benefits." (Emphasis added.) See In re Yarn Spinners' Agreement,
L.R. 1 R.P. 118 (1959), 22 MODERN L. Rav. 416 (1959). The court in rejecting
this exemption specifically found that in view of the size, sound financial condition,
research activities and long-range future potential of the six companies, neither
quality of the product nor research activity would be affected by voiding the agree-
ment, and that the companies' tendencies to subcontract among members would be
detrimental rather than beneficial to the public good. Furthermore, the effect of the
agreement would be a rise in price. Thus under no theory could the public be con-
sidered as gaining by the restrictions.
94 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 21(1)(d). While the court accepted the contention of
the respondent association that as regards the English home market, the Central
Electricity Generating Board was a "preponderant buyer," it refused this justification
on the ground that there was no evidence that the Electricity Board had in the past
or would in the future use its buying power to extract unfair prices from sellers.
Inasmuch as the Board is a semi-public body, this finding would appear particularly
likely.
104 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 21(1) (f) : "that, having regard to the conditions actually
obtaining or reasonably foreseen at the time of the application, the removal of the
restriction would be likely to cause a reduction in the volume or earnings of the export
business which is substantial either in relation to the whole export business of the
United Kingdom or in relation to the whole business (including export business) of
the said trade or industry . . . ." The court found that there was greater coordi-
nation within the association, and a greater need for it, in regard to overseas orders.
It was customary in such cases to hold a special early meeting preliminary to the
usual tabling meeting, so that there could be intricate joint analysis of specifications,
communication of technical and commercial knowhow, and sharing of tips as to possible
competitive offers by foreign firms prior to the entry of bids. Indeed, the court was
satisfied that "the principal object of members, when dealing with overseas orders
. . . is to bring the order home to this country . . . ." In re Water-Tube Boiler-
makers' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 285, 342 (1959). The court found further that rule 5
had the beneficial effect of obviating a possible danger of cut-backs in overseas
personnel. And in answer to the Registrar's contention that abolition of the rule
would not affect a substantial portion of the export trade, the court reasoned that
since boiler contracts were becoming fewer and the size of the boilers contracted
for larger, loss of even one overseas contract would be sufficient to represent a sub-
stantial cut in volume or in gross earnings for the industry.
"1 Id. at 346.
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lions of section 21 of the act: the export-trade-effect exception of subsection
(f), and the tailgate clause of subparagraph (1) which demands that the
court balance the merit, in the circumstances, of the enumerated sustaining
grounds met by a restriction, and the public detriment which may result
therefrom.12  While it is clear that the burden of proof of bringing them-
selves within one or more of the specific justifications is squarely upon
respondents or their agreement must fail as being "presumptively" con-
trary to the public interest, 1' the language of the tailgate clause leaves
uncertain whether under it they bear the same onus of proof.' 4 The court
in the Yarn Spinners' case ' 5 indicated in passing that the burden was the
same under the tailgate clause as under the specific exemptions; 16 thus
respondents who have brought themselves within the shelter of a specific
gateway would further have to overcome not only the Registrar's objections
but an overriding presumption that all agreements in restraint of trade and
commerce are adverse to the public interest. However, the statutory lan-
guage would seem equally to support the alternative construction that such
evidence as satisfies an excepting clause will entitle respondents ultimately
to prevail in the absence of a preponderant showing by the Registrar of a
quantum of detriment which makes the restriction "unreasonable." 17 The
crucial significance of this placing of the burden has been recognized by at
least one writer: 18 very few restrictive agreements could be expected to
escape the statutory ban if justification required an affirmative and pre-
dominant demonstration not merely of specific exemption but also of public
benefit.
124 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 21(1). The section prescribes that "a restriction accepted
in pursuance of any agreement shall be deemed to be contrary to the public interest
unless the Court is satisfied of any one or more of the following circumstances . ... "
After the seven exemptive subsections there follows the tailgate clause which requires
that the court be "further satisfied (in any such case) that the restriction is not
unreasonable having regard to the balance between those circumstances and any
detriment to the public or to persons not parties to the agreement . . . resulting or
likely to result from the operation of the restriction." In none of the four cases
previously decided by the court had the export-trade justification been advanced,
and in none had the court had occasion to deal in detail with the effect of § 2 1's
general anti-restriction presumption upon the tailgate clause. In re Wholesale &
Retail Bakers Ass'n's Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 347 (1959); In re Blanket Mfgs.'
Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 208, appeal dismissed, L.R. 1 R.P. 271 (C.A. 1959); In re
Yarn Spinners' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 118 (1959); In re Chemists' Fed'n Agree-
ment (No. 2), L.R. 1 R.P. 75 (1958).
13 See Address For The British Association by R. L. Sich, Registrar of Restric-
tive Trading Agreements, pp. 3-5 (Sept. 3, 1959).
14 Dennison, The British Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956, 2 J. LAw &
EcoN. 64 (1959); 22 MODERN L. REV. 416, 420-21 (1959).
15 L.R. 1 R.P. 118 (1959).
16 Id. at 189; see 22 MODERN L. Rnv. 416, 420-21 (1959).
17 Under this view, the respondents and the Registrar would each bear the obli-
gation of coming forward with evidence to show, respectively, benefit and detriment,
with the court balancing the two. See Address For The British Association by R. L.
Sich, Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements, pp. 4-5 (Sept. 3, 1959). Pre-
sumably, as the court need only be satisfied that the restriction is "not unreasonable,"
an agreement would be sustained unless the evidence of detriment predominates.
1822 MODERN L. REv. 416, 420-21 (1959).
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Although the court's opinion deals only sparingly with the export
clause and passes without comment over the burden of proof problem, its
method of reasoning has singular significance for both issues. In sustaining
rule 5 as one whose abrogation was likely to reduce the export business-
largely on the grounds that the exchange of market information, specifica-
tions, cost factor data and technical knowledge achieved under the rtile was
instrumental in maintaining the association members' market position in
certain overseas areas, and that the loss of even a single substantial boiler
contract from abroad would constitute a considerable loss of trade in
pounds sterling 19-the court was recognizing economic realities of indis-
putable cogency. But what is remarkable is that the Restrictive Practices
Court seems not to have regarded its functions under the act as including
inquiry into whether there might not be alternative modes of associative
cooperation equally efficient in the achievement of these desired ends, and
less restrictive of competition.2 0  Yet there would appear to be other pos-
sible information-sharing arrangements which do not embody the risks of
rule 5's "selected member" procedure.2 1 Nor did the court consider
whether these industry advantages might have been as effectively realized
by an agreement which pertained solely to foreign orders. Association
rules and trade restrictions which operate only with regard to foreign trade
are not covered by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, nor are they under
any legal ban.22 Indeed, it may have been this approach of accepting out
of hand the whole of the current association procedure as the inevitable cost
of whatever benefits it brought, which led the court to its "paradoxical"
rejection of the Registrar's fundamental contention: that the lowest price
(barring any deterioration in quality) will usually secure more business and
capture a larger share of the market, thereby bringing into use present
excess capacity and reducing overhead costs.2 3  Similarly, in its analysis
under the tailgate clause, the court appears to have accepted without com-
ment the view that this clause merely places upon respondents the obliga-
tion of coming forward with convincing evidence of benefit, leaving to the
19 See note 10 supra.
20 Compare the approach taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
21 Compare Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925),
with American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, supra note 20.
22 See 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 8(8). Under § 31 (1) several of the reporting, though
none of the control, sections of the act apply. While by the proviso to § 31(2) the
provisions of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act
of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 66, are not avoided, the latter act is directed at the investi-
gation and disclosure of monopoly and does not delegate judicial or administrative
power to invalidate restrictive agreements. Parliamentary action is required to work
such invalidation. See also ALBERY & FLETCHER-CooKF, MONOPOLIES AND RESTRCTIvE
PRACTICES 30-31 (1956).
23 The court stated at 343: "Paradoxical though it may seem, we do believe in
fact that the continued existence of the rule will enable the members to obtain a
larger share of the overseas orders (which cannot be numerous) than would be the
case if the restriction was abolished."
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Registrar the burden of pleading and proving general detriment.24 The
court gave particularly meager consideration to the argument urged by the
Registrar (and admitted in the court's opinion) 25 that under the restriction
domestic purchasers might very probably have to pay higher prices for
boilers; and it entirely neglected to mention the rule's potential effects on
boilermakers not members of the association. 26 Yet if the "further satis-
fied" language of the tailgate clause 27 means anything in connection with
the export exception, certainly it means that the central issue before the
court was precisely whether the home market, on balance, should be re-
quired to subsidize the boilermakers' more flexible price position overseas.
In failing to speak articulately to this issue,28 and especially in failing to
consider it in the light of possible alternative arrangements, the court's
opinion appears to undertake less than that full scope of investigation to
which the Restrictive Trade Practices Act sets it.
24 This is the view that the Registrar has since taken. See Address For The
British Association by R. L. Sich, Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements,
pp. 4-5 (Sept. 3, 1959).
25 Instant case at 346.
26 The tailgate clause specifically directs consideration of (in addition to "public"
detriment) detriment to "persons not parties to the agreement." See note 12 supra.
27See note 12 supra for a description of the scheme of § 21 of the act.
28 The court seems to have deemed the export trade so important per se that a
studied analysis of the effect of the rule on the home market was not called for.
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